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ABSTRACT 
An analysis of the effects of the probability of informed  
trading (PIN) on corporate diversification discount  
and CEO pay-performance sensitivity:  
Evidence from China 
by 
JIN Man 
Master of Philosophy 
This thesis includes estimating the probability of informed trading, PIN, 
developed by Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1996, 1997a, 1997b), for a large sample of 
listed firms in China from 2002 to 2008, and I use PIN to explore two independent 
research questions in corporate finance. 
First, the probability of informed trading is applied to explain the discount in 
value for firms with diversified business operations. Although aiming to increase 
firm value, the corporate diversification decision usually results in a firm value 
discount, for a variety of reasons, one of which is the transparency problem.  My 
study directly tests the relation between the information asymmetry revealed from 
the stock market and the firm value discount due to diversification decision. The 
results show that the corporate diversification decisions result in a lower firm value 
in China, mainly because the diversified firms suffer from a higher level of 
information asymmetry or a lower level of transparency. After controlling for the 
measure of information asymmetry, the strategy of diversification itself does not 
reduce firm value. 
Second, the probability of informed trading is applied to explain the pay-
performance sensitivity of CEO compensation in Chinese listed firms. The pay-
performance sensitivity measures the change in managerial compensation based on 
the change in shareholder wealth. A higher information asymmetry helps and 
encourages shareholders to spend more on incentivizing the management team. My 
results show that higher level information asymmetry is associated with higher pay-
performance sensitivity of CEOs in China. The result also holds if information 
asymmetry is approximated by analysts’ forecast errors.  
According to the estimates of PIN in this thesis, Chinese firms are shown to 
exhibit a higher level of information asymmetry than what has been found in the U.S. 
market. The thesis ends with a brief discussion of the results and what future research 
could follow. 
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An analysis of the effects of the probability of informed  
trading (PIN) on corporate diversification discount 
 and CEO pay-performance sensitivity:  
Evidence from China 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction  
 
Information asymmetry is a core concept in economic and financial theory 
and is a key concept of the risk and uncertainty faced by investors in all of the 
world’s financial markets. However, information asymmetry is unobservable and, 
until recently, there has been no satisfactory proxy of it. In a series of paper in the 
1990s, Easley et al. (1996, 1997a, 1997b) developed a new approach to measure 
information asymmetry based on market price data that is called the probability of 
informed trading (PIN). PIN is now well accepted and has been applied to various 
research studies on the stock markets in the U.S. (e.g., Easley et al., 1998; Easley et 
al., 2002; Vega, 2006; Yan and Zhang, 2010), in Europe (e.g., Borisova and Yadav, 
2008), in Hong Kong (e.g., Cai et al., 2006; Wong et al., 2008), and in Taiwan (e.g., 
Lu and Wong, 2008). In this study, I extend the research on the probability of 
informed trading to China’s stock markets and investigate the informational role on 
two individual topics; they are: the effect of information asymmetry on the 
diversification discount and the effect of information asymmetry on managerial 
incentives. Although, previous researches have estimated the PIN in China (e.g., 
Chan et al., 2008; Copeland et al., 2009), they focus on certain time periods or on a 
single stock exchange. I use high frequency data and estimate PIN for 1,762 firms 
including both A-shares and B-shares listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE 
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hereafter) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE hereafter) for seven years from 
2002 to 2008. 
With PIN as a proxy of information asymmetry, I perform two independent 
research studies to evaluate the informational role of stock prices in China: the effect 
of information asymmetry on the diversification discount and the effect of 
information asymmetry on managerial incentives. For the first research study 
presented in Chapter 3, I test the relation between information asymmetry and firm 
diversification and find that diversified firms have higher information asymmetry 
than focused firms. Furthermore, the lack of transparency directly leads diversified 
firms to be valued less by the investors when compared with non-diversified firms. 
Consequently, information asymmetry is responsible for the diversification discount 
in China.  For the second research study presented in Chapter 4, I investigate the 
effect of PIN on managerial incentives based on the analysis of Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1993). The results support the important role of information on the executive 
compensation contract, and show that a higher CEO’s pay-performance sensitivity is 
shown to be related with higher PIN. After controlling for endogeneity, the relation 
between the level of information asymmetry and managerial pay-performance 
sensitivity is still significantly positive. 
My studies use data from China’s stock markets while the literature starts 
from tests applied to the U.S. data. The case of China is potentially more interesting, 
because the Chinese markets have a number of features which make them different 
from the matured financial markets. Previous studies (e.g., Copeland et al., 2009) 
suggest that information asymmetry is more serious in transition markets, such as in 
China, than in developed markets, for a variety of reasons. First, the Chinese stock 
markets are dominated by individual investors, who are in the disadvantaged position 
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in obtaining and processing information compared to institutional investors. In the 
U.S., stock markets are largely influenced by institutional investors.  Secondly, the 
market mechanism adopted by the Chinese stock exchanges, including the lunch 
break, short sales constraints and daily price limits, might hinder information from 
being revealed and slow down the price discovery process. Thirdly, the corporate 
structure of Chinese listed firms also makes them different from those in the 
developed economies. All of China’s listed firms have a controlling or major 
shareholder, who is often the regional or the central government. Government control 
and the political connection between the firms and the state might affect the firm’s 
level of information asymmetry and other corporate decisions, including the 
diversification decision and managerial compensation. Hence, I explicitly evaluate 
the effects of governmental influence and find it does play a significant role. 
The rest of my thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 contains a brief 
overview of the Chinese stock markets. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are two independent 
chapters investigating the two different research questions. Chapter 3 presents the 
analysis on the role of information asymmetry on the diversification discount. 
Chapter 4 discusses the effect of stock price informativeness on managerial 
incentives. Chapter 5 summarizes the main findings of the paper.      
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Chapter 2. Overview of China’s stock market  
 
There are two stock exchanges operating independently in mainland China, 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE hereafter) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(SZSE hereafter), which were established respectively in December 1990 and July 
1991. Two categories of stocks are listed and traded on SHSE and SZSE: A-shares 
and B-shares. A-shares are traded in the local Renminbi Yuan (RMB hereafter) 
currency, while B-shares are traded in U.S. dollars in SHSE and in Hong Kong 
dollars in SZSE. Initially, trading in A-shares is restricted to Chinese citizens only 
while B-shares are available to both the domestic (since 2001) and foreign investors. 
Since December 2002, foreign investors are allowed (with limitations) to trade the A-
shares under the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) program 1 . The 
majority of A-shares are issued by State Owned Enterprises (SOE hereafter), whose 
share ownership can be classified as: (1) state shares, held by the government 
through a designated government agency; (2) legal shares, held by legal entities, such 
as enterprises and other economic entities, but not individuals; and (3) public shares, 
traded by individuals. B-shares are all ordinary shares and the owners of B-shares 
have the same voting rights and dividends as the owners of A-shares.  
The two stock exchanges have grown rapidly since trading started in 1990. 
By the end of 2010, the SHSE had become the fifth largest stock exchange in the 
world with 900 listed companies. The SHSE and SZSE together list more than 2,000 
companies with a combined market capitalization of US$4.0 trillion (2010), which 
exceeds the market capitalization of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (US$3.7 trillion).  
China’s stock market is now the second largest market in the world. More and more 
                                                            
1The QFII program was officially launched in 2003. 
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international investors are turning to China because of its abundant business 
opportunities. Concomitantly, there has been a big increase in the demand for 
research on China’s financial markets and listed companies. 
Table 1 presents some statistics obtained from the webpage of the two stock 
exchanges in China from 2002 to 2008. The number of listed companies has grown 
steadily over the years. From 2002 to 2005, the market price declined slightly. This 
was followed by a bull market run in 2006 and 2007 where stock prices surged 
threefold. Starting in 2008, market prices dropped. 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
The SHSE and SZSE in China are purely order-driven markets without 
marketmakers. Both of them run electronic automated trading systems, which are 
open from Monday to Friday. The trading day begins with centralized competitive 
pricing in call auctions from 09:15 am to 09:25 am and continues with consecutive 
bidding from 09:30 am to 11:30 am. After a lunch break of one and a half hours, the 
consecutive trading in the afternoon session starts from 13:00 and finishes at 15:00. 
As regards to market transparency, the best five bid and ask prices and corresponding 
depths of the book are revealed continuously to the public investors. The minimum 
price variation unit is 0.01 RMB and the minimum trading quantity is one lot of 100 
shares. A call auction is conducted in the first session from 09:15 am to 09:25 am to 
generate opening prices. The open call auction is then followed by continuous double 
auctions, where submitted buy and sell limit orders are matched through the price 
and time priority rules, and trades take place when orders are matched. Unless 
cancelled, the unmatched orders remain in the order queues in the limit order book 
until the market closes.  
8 
 
Most trading accounts in the SHSE and SZSE belong to individual investors. 
In China, as shown in Ng and Wu (2007), only the trading activities of institutions 
and of a small group of wealthiest individuals can affect future stock volatility, while 
those of ordinary individual investors at large can not. In order to protect the retail 
investors from extreme and adverse price movements, short sales are prohibited, and 
a daily price limit of 10% is imposed on the fluctuations of stock price from the 
previous day’s closing price. However, short sale constraints and daily price limits 
can prevent information from being fully revealed. According to Wong et al. (2008), 
informed traders with negative news tend to use short sales. They show that in the 
Hong Kong stock market, the level of informed trades based on negative news is 
lower when the stocks are not allowed to be short sold. In other words, the short sale 
constraints tend to hinder negative information from being fully incorporated into 
prices. The event study of Cai et al. (2006) also shows that after the removal of the 
short sale constraints in Hong Kong, there are more informed trades in the stock 
market. The price limit rule is also found to reduce information efficiency in China 
(Wong et al., 2009), as the bid-ask spread is wider when the stock price approaches 
to the floor limits than in the normal market condition. They conjecture that this is 
due to the panic selling activities of uninformed investors when a stock price falls 
towards its floor limit. 
Many listed firms in China are controlled or owned by the government. This 
state ownership of shares might impact managerial incentives and intensify the 
conflicts between management and investors due to political connections. In firms 
controlled by private blockholders, a CEO’s pay is more sensitive to the change in 
stockholders’ wealth when compared to that in firms controlled by a state agency 
(Firth et al., 2006).  Moreover, firms ultimately owned by the government are less 
9 
 
likely to diversify and perform worse than those owned by private blockholders (Lin 
and Su, 2008).  
China’s financial markets are growing very fast. The introduction of new 
products, especially the exchange-traded index derivatives, and the revisions and 
development of financial regulations will surely attract the attentions of more and 
more market practitioners and academic researcher around the world. I believe my 
thesis makes a good contribution to the literature and has a resonance for other 
emerging markets that are transiting from state control to a market based economy. 
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Chapter 3. Information asymmetry and the diversification discount: evidence 
from listed firms in China 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Diversification (multi-segment) is a form of corporate strategy for a company, 
which seeks to increase profitability through greater sales volume obtained from new 
product lines and new markets. However, an extensive literature from the U.S. has 
shown that, on average, diversification is a value-decreasing activity and firms with 
multi-segment businesses sell at a discount to non-diversified firms2 (e.g. Myers and 
Majluf, 1984; Scharfstein, 1998; Jensen, 1986; Gilson et al., 2001). Previous studies 
have examined differences in firm characteristics such as the size, profitability and 
leverage to help explain the different valuation of the diversified firms and focused 
firms. There is less empirical evidence on why this discount exists. One possible 
explanation for a discount is that corporate diversification is associated with a higher 
level of asymmetric information due to the decrease of transparency (Hadlock et al., 
2001). I extend previous research by examining the relation between diversification 
discount and the level of information asymmetry for the firms listed in China’s stock 
market. I argue that the accounting figures for diversified firms are less transparent 
and less informative than those for focused firms because of the aggregated nature of 
diversified firms’ consolidated accounting reports. Thus, investors tend to give lower 
valuation to diversified firms.  
                                                            
2 There is an active debate on how diversification affects firm value in pervious literatures. Some 
support that diversification is value-destroying and will lead to a loss of firm value, particularly for the 
firms in the U.S.. In contrast, some argue that diversification is a value-enhancing activity.  Lin and Su 
(2008) suggest that diversified firms have significantly higher Tobin’s q than non-diversified firms in 
China, and the valuation of diversification depends on government control. I will explicitly describe 
the arguments of both sides in the coming literature review part and  explain why I believe there is a 
diversification discount in China in the part of empirical analysis.  
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This chapter aims to answer the question of whether corporate diversification 
directly causes firm value discounts or does it lead to discounts indirectly through 
influencing the firm’s level of information asymmetry, using data from Chinese 
listed firms. I expect that increased information asymmetry in multi-segment firms is 
responsible for the diversification discount. 
Prior empirical evidence shows that diversification activity can profoundly 
affect firm value, but has shed less light on how this happened. Thomas (2002) 
claims that diversified firms are subject to larger asymmetric information problems 
and lower transparency than non-diversified firms. Thomas and Fee (2000) using 
data from the U.S. show that diversified firms with high levels of information 
asymmetry trade at a significant discount to firm value. Therefore, I directly examine 
the characteristics of diversified firms, especially the level of information asymmetry 
and its effects on the firm value discount in China. My study differs from Thomas 
(2002) and Thomas and Fee (2000) in that, for the first time, I apply the effect of 
information asymmetry on diversification discount to firms listed in China over a 
long time period and for a large sample size. 
China offers a unique economic and financial environment to address this 
issue. First of all, China’s financial market are less fully developed and largely 
segmented from the rest of the world.  Lin and Su (2008) suggest China’s financial 
market is characterized by a lack of reliable information and a high degree of 
information asymmetry. In addition, the Chinese government retains a lot of direct 
control over large firms. In particular, most listed firms in China have a controlling 
shareholder, who is the central or regional government. This political influence will 
have repercussions for a firm’s strategies including diversification and new product 
development. Accordingly, I first examine whether the diversified firms trade a 
13 
 
lower price or price-multiple than non-diversified firms in China. Second, if a 
diversification discount exists, I will investigate if this is due to information 
asymmetry. 
In this paper, I use the probability of informed trading (PIN)3 as the proxy for 
information asymmetry and use Tobin’s Q as the proxy of firm value. To measure 
the level of diversification, I adopt the dummy variable (DIV) and sales-based 
Herfindahl index (HI). By comparing the mean differences in Tobin’s Q between 
diversified firms and non-diversified firms, I find that diversified firms are valued 
less by the market compared with focused firms. The regression results indicate that 
diversified firms have more severe information asymmetry problems after controlling 
for the differences in other firm characteristics. Furthermore, I confirm a significant 
relation between information asymmetry and the diversification discount, indicating 
that information asymmetry can explain the loss of firm value for conglomerates. 
The results remain significant in my robustness tests when an alternative econometric 
model is applied. Other features of diversified firms are also found in this paper, in 
particular, diversified firms, on average, have smaller firm size, lower stock price 
volatility, lower growth of assets, lower return on assets, lower state ownership, 
lower institutional ownership and lower ownership concentration, but have longer 
firm listing history when compared with individual focused firms.  
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I introduce the 
background literature. In Section 3, I describe the data sample and the variables. 
Section 4 shows some preliminary results and analysis on diversified firms. Section 5 
provides the main results. Section 6 includes robustness test. Section 7 concludes 
with a summary of the findings.  
                                                            
3 The PIN estimates will be explicitly introduced in the following section. 
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3.2 Literature review 
 There is an active debate on how diversification affects firm value.  One 
argument is that conglomerates create value for the company. Firstly, diversification 
can be a source of extra value resulting from the increase of the firm’s debt capacity 
(Lewellen, 1971) and the decrease of the variation in cash flow (Amit and Livnat, 
1988). Secondly, diversified firms have higher efficiency in resource allocation 
through the internal capital markets (Weston, 1969; Williamson, 1983). Thirdly, 
diversification may create shareholder value by mitigating risks in product, labor and 
financial markets (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Martin and Sayrak, 2003). Finally, 
diversification is also beneficial in terms of economies of scope (Panzar and Willig, 
1981; Teece, 1980; Teece 1982).  The above theories are supported by empirical 
evidence. Villalonga (2004) finds that the diversified firms in the U.S. trade at a 
significant premium using census data at the establishment level.  
On the other hand, some researchers claim that the diversification is value-
destroying due to inefficient internal capital markets (Scharfstein, 1998; Scharfstein 
and Stein, 2000; Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000), increased agency problems 
(Jensen, 1986), information asymmetry between the managers and outside investors 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984), and a lack of financial analysts’ specialization in 
conglomerates (Gilson et al., 2001). Early empirical studies support the 
diversification discount theory using samples from all over the world. Lang and Stulz 
(1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) find a valuation discount for U.S diversified 
companies. Lins and Servaes (1999, 2002) find a significant discount for diversified 
firms in Japan, the United Kingdom and a number of East Asian countries.  In China, 
Zhang et al. (2005) and Hong et al. (2006) find that the diversified firms have lower 
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stock market valuations than focused firms and the loss of firm value becomes more 
severe after controlling for the endogeneity problem.  
A large academic literature has explored extensively the information 
asymmetry revealed from the trading actions of investors. On one hand, some 
research focuses on the determinants of the asymmetric information theoretically and 
empirically (e.g., Easley et al., 1998; Aslan et al., 2008; Bardong et al., 2009). In 
summary, information asymmetry measures in the U.S. are shown to be significantly 
and positively related with trading volumes, return on assets and negatively related 
with firm size, firm age and Tobin’s Q. The estimated PINs are also shown to be 
higher for firms in the industries of Oil and Petroleum Products, Construction, 
Textiles and Retail in the U.S. market (Aslan et al., 2008). In a search for the factors 
leading to information asymmetry, other research focuses on some particular firm-
specific factors. Also for the U.S. market, Brown et al. (2009) find that information 
asymmetry decreases (increases) immediately following positive (negative) earnings 
surprises. Borisova and Yadav (2010) apply the measures of information asymmetry 
to firms in European Union and find that firms in which the government still retains a 
stake after privatization exhibit a lower level of information asymmetry than do the 
fully privatized peer firms.  
Another stream of the literature applies informed trading to asset pricing. 
Easley et al. (2002) considers the effect of information asymmetry on a stock’s 
required returns and find that stocks in the U.S. market with higher PINs consistently 
generate higher excess returns than those with lower PINs. The price risk of 
information asymmetry is also tested for stocks traded in China. Chan et al. (2008) 
show that the measures of information asymmetry explain a significant portion of the 
cross-sectional variation in the foreign share discounts. Therefore, foreign investors 
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demand a higher rate of return as compensation for bearing a higher information risk 
when investing stocks in China. Extending research on U.S. stocks to the A-shares 
traded on the SHSE, Copeland et al. (2009) find that the PINs significantly explain 
the returns even after controlling for the Fama-French (1992) three factors4. 
Some previous literature also has directly tested the relationship between 
information asymmetry and diversification. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) 
find that firms that engage in spin-offs have a higher level of information asymmetry 
compared with their industry- and size-matched counterparts. Thomas (2002) 
examines the relation between corporate diversification and information asymmetry 
using analyst’s forecasts and abnormal returns associated with earnings 
announcement as proxies of asymmetric information. He finds that greater 
diversification is not associated with increased asymmetric information in the U.S. 
market. Clarke et al. (2004) conclude that there are potential information benefits of 
diversification since asymmetric information regarding each segment’s performance 
is diversified away across segments. They also provide empirical evidence in the U.S. 
supporting the notion that the level of information asymmetry reduces after 
diversification. Although there is no evidence of a positive relation between 
diversification and asymmetric information in Thomas and Fee (2000), it suggests 
that diversified firms with high levels of information asymmetry trade at a significant 
discount to firm value. I extend previous research by examining the relation between 
the diversification discount and the level of information asymmetry in China. 
 
                                                            
4 A similar study of Lu and Wong (2008) finds that information risk is priced for the stocks traded on 
theTaiwan stock exchange.  
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3.3 Data and variables 
This section introduces the data selection as well as the methodology that I 
employ to construct the estimates of diversification, the measures of information 
asymmetry and the control variables. 
 
3.3.1 Data 
A firm is required to disclose the results of its individual business segments if 
any segment contributes 10% or greater of total sales. Following Lin and Su (2008), 
firms with two or more segments are considered to be diversified or multi-segment 
firms. Firms, for which one segment accounts for more than 90% of sales, are 
undiversified or single-segment firms. The accounting information, industrial sector 
data and stock returns data are from the Wind Financial Database (WindDB) and the 
China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. 
The intraday data used to estimate PIN are extracted from the high frequency 
database of SinoFin, and consist of all time-stamped trades and quotes from January 
2002 to December 2008 for A-(local) and B-(foreign) shares traded on the SHSE and 
SZSE in China. Following Chan et al. (2008), I exclude the days when trading was 
halted (i.e. when shares reach the price limit of a 10% change with respect to the 
previous day’s close price), and those trading days with less than 100 transactions, 
and I exclude the first and last fifteen minutes of each trading session during the day. 
Following Easley et al. (2002), we require a minimum of 60 trading days in one year.   
The sample of annual PIN estimates initially includes 1,869 firms during the 
period from 2002 to 2008. I exclude 30 financial firms because they are subject to 
very specific regulations and have very special characteristics that make them very 
different to other firms. I also exclude the observations when data about 
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diversification are not available and exclude the observations in 2002 when the data 
of the corporate ownership concentration are not available. Due to the unavailability 
of some financial data, the final sample consists of 1,131 different firms with a total 
of 5,377 firm-years observations from 2003 to 2008. 
 
3.3.2 Measuring information asymmetry  
Information asymmetry is estimated according to the microstructure model 
proposed in a series of papers by Easley et al. (1996, 1997a, 1997b), which provides 
a measure of the probability of information based trading PIN. In their model, 
marketmakers, through observing market data, update their beliefs of the probability 
of the trade based on private information and then set the new price. Therefore, over 
time stock prices converge to the true value of an asset (i.e. the firm) and reflect full 
information. The model of PIN allows us to make inferences of the unobservable 
informed trading using the observable trade and quotation data.  
According to the setting of the model, a new information event occurs at the 
beginning of a trading day with a probability of α. If the event occurs, good news 
happens with a probability of (1-δ) and bad news happens with a probability of δ. 
Whether there is new information at the beginning of the trading day and whether the 
news is good or bad are chosen by nature. Throughout the trading day, trades are 
assumed to arrive following Poisson processes. Orders from informed traders arrive 
at a rate of μ (only on information event days). Informed traders buy if the event is 
good and otherwise sell. Buy orders from uninformed traders arrive at a rate of εb, 
and sell orders from uninformed traders arrive at a rate of εs. Easley et al. (1996, 
1997a, 1997b) show that the unobservable parameter set, θ=(α, δ, μ, εb, εs ), reflecting 
the information structure of trades, can be estimated via maximum likelihood. 
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For a single trading day i, the likelihood function is:  
ܮሺߠ|ܤ௜, ௜ܵሻ ൌ ߙሺ1 െ ߜሻ݁ିሺఓାఌ್ሻ ሺߤ ൅ ߝ௕ሻ
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ିఌೞ ߝ௦ௌ೔
௜ܵ! 																												݁ݍ. ሺ3.1ሻ 
where Bi and Si denote respectively the total number of buyer-initiated and seller-
initiated trades for day i and  θ=(α, δ, μ, εb, εs ) is the parameter vector.  
Assuming that trading days are independent, Easley et al. (2002) give the 
likelihood function for a period of I trading days as follows:  
                 																																ܮሺߠ|ܯሻ ൌ ∏ ܮሺߠ|ܤ௜, ௜ܵሻூ௜ୀଵ 																					݁ݍ. ሺ3.2ሻ                                      
where )),(),...,,(( 11 II SBSBM  represents the dataset during the I trading days. 
Maximizing (3.2) by using the dataset M can provide the estimates of the parameters.  
The probability that the trade is information-based, PIN, is derived as follows: 
																																										ܲܫܰ ൌ ߙߤߙߤ ൅ ߝ௕ ൅ ߝ௦ 																												݁ݍ. ሺ3.3ሻ 
where αμ is the daily arrival of informed trades and (αμ+εb+εs) is the arrival of both 
informed and uninformed trades. The PIN variables provide a direct measure of the 
risk derived from information-based trading and reflect the level of information 
asymmetry. PIN has been widely applied to the stocks in different countries over 
different time periods for various research questions in the previous literature5.  
                                                            
5 The PIN estimates have been applied to the stocks listed in the NYSE that operates with a specialist 
system [see Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002), Bardong et al. (2009) and others].  It has also been 
applied by other researchers to stock markets that are order-driven without marketmakers. For 
example, Borisova and Yadav (2008) use PIN for stocks in European countries; Copeland et al. (2009) 
and Chan et al. (2010) use PIN for stocks in mainland China; and Lu and Wong (2008) use PIN for 
stocks in Taiwan stock market. In an order-driven market, the uninformed trader, similar to a 
marketmaker in the specialist system, serves as the liquidity provider to the liquidity demander who is 
an informed trader. 
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In order to estimate PIN, the daily number of buys (Bi) and sells (Si) are 
required. However, the dataset records the intraday trades and quotations without 
showing whether each trade is initiated by a buy or a sell. Following Easley et al. 
(2002), I use the standard Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to classify the trades as 
buys or sells. The algorithm classifies any trade with a trading price higher (lower) 
than the immediate midpoint of the bid and ask as a buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) 
trade. For a trade happening at the midpoint, it is classified as a buy (sell) if its price 
is higher (lower) than the most recent but different trading price6. Following Lee and 
Ready (1991), I adopt a five-second lag of the recorded quotation time to adjust for 
the difference between the recording times of the trades and of the quotes. 
The maximization of the likelihood function, (3.2), starts from self-selected 
starting values for the five parameters. Following Yan and Zhang (2010), Venter and 
Jongh (2004) and Borisova and Yadav (2010), I specify 125 sets of starting values 
for the five parameters. The maximization is performed based on each set of the 
acceptable starting values and then the one that achieves convergence and generates 
the highest value of the likelihood function is used. 
Table 2 provides the summary statistics of the annual estimates of PIN and its 
parameter measures for all shares traded on the SHSE and SZSE during the period 
from January 2002 to December 2008. Panel A presents the statistics of PIN. Overall, 
the mean (median) PIN is 0.23 (0.22) and the standard deviation is 0.08. The average 
estimate of PIN across all firms is 0.215 in 2002 and it remains at a relatively high 
level in the following four years. In 2007 and 2008, there is a substantial reduction in 
the average PIN. One possible explanation is that starting from the bull market in 
2006, more uninformed investors join the financial market. In that case, the arrival 
                                                            
6 If the trading price equals the previous trading price, I will revert to additional lags. The maximum 
number of lags is two in our study. 
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rates of uninformed investors (both buyers and sellers) substantially increase. This 
explanation is supported by evidence from the average arrival rates of uninformed 
buyers (εb) and sellers (εs), which are respectively 73.91 and 78.65 in 2006, and are 
almost tripled up to 232.32 and 240.71 in 2007. The arrival rate of informed 
investors (μ) increases too but at a lower percentage rate from 2006 to 2007. In 
addition to the stimulus from the bull market, the reform of non-tradable shares 
7could also attract individual investors to join the market and then raise the arrival 
rate of uninformed investors after 2006. By the end of 2006, 1,301 listed companies 
on mainland markets have undergone or already completed their non-tradable share 
reforms, accounting for 97 percent of the total companies that need to be reformed. 
The aim of the reform is to change the situation of two kinds of stocks and pricings 
co-existing in the same market and to strengthen the common interests of all 
shareholders. In other words, it protects the interests of individual investors and 
makes the financial markets more attractive to them. Therefore, the reform of non-
tradable shares is probably responsible for the higher arrival rate of uninformed 
investors and lower PIN in 2007 and 2008. However, since there is no data precisely 
capture the process of each firm in its reform of non-shares, we can not empirically 
evaluate the effect of this reform towards my results. Moreover, the average PIN in 
the SZSE is significantly higher than the one for the SHSE at the 5% level. 
Panel B in Table 2 shows the statistics of the estimated parameters that are 
used to calculate PIN over the entire sample period. The mean (median) of α, the 
                                                            
7Not all the shares in a company incorporated in China that are listed on a stock exchange are freely 
tradable. The split share structure of the Chinese public securities market refers to the existence of a 
large amount of non-tradable shares, including state-owned shares and legal person shares of a listed 
Chinese company. Only about one-third of the shares in a listed Chinese company are freely tradable. 
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 2005 published the guidance notes on the 
split share structure reform of listed companies or the reform of non-tradable shares. The reform is 
designed to float the non-tradable legal person shares through the open market. Such legal person 
shares could, under the reform program, be converted to tradable A-shares. The converted A-shares 
are subject to a lockup period. 
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probability of an information event in a day, is 0.287 (0.266), and the mean (median) 
δ is 0.362 (0.227), indicating that most of the information is good news.    
 [TABLE 2 HERE] 
According to Chan et al. (2008), the average level of the PIN estimate is 
higher for the B-shares than for the A-shares due to the small amount of uninformed 
trades in the B-shares market. I analyze firms that have both A-shares and B-shares 
in one sample. In Table 3, the PIN statistics of B-shares versus the corresponding A-
shares are presented. The differences in PIN between A-shares and B-shares are not 
consistently positive or negative over years. In most years, the PIN estimate is higher 
for B-shares than the A-shares, because the PIN parameters, εb and εs, are 
significantly higher for A-shares than for B-shares. The difference in εb and εs 
between A-shares and B-shares are significantly and positively different from zero at 
the 1% level for all years in both exchanges. As pointed out by Chan et al. (2008), 
the higher information asymmetry in the B-shares market is attributed to the 
relatively low number of uninformed trades. However, the PIN estimate and its 
parameters in my study are not directly comparable to those in Chan et al. (2008). 
They focus on the event when Chinese citizens are allowed to trade B-shares in 
March 2001 using the monthly PIN from January 2000 to November 2001, while my 
data start from 2002.  
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
Lin and Su (2008) claims that China’s financial markets are less fully 
developed and largely segmented from the rest of the world. They are characterized 
by a lack of reliable information and a high degree of information asymmetry. 
Comparing my estimates with the estimates of PIN in other regions, the Chinese 
firms are shown to have a higher level of information asymmetry. In Easley et al. 
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(2002), the mean, median and maximum of PIN in the U.S. from 1983 to 1998, are 
respectively 0.191, 0.185 and 0.530. In Taiwan, the PIN statistics from 1997 to 2005, 
reported by Lu and Wong (2008), have a mean of 0.20 and a median of 0.18. 
Different from our study, Copeland et al. (2009) estimate the monthly PIN in the 
SHSE from 2001 to 2006 and find an average of 0.114.  
 
3.3.3 Measuring diversification and firm value 
I construct two alternative proxies for firm diversification following Lin and 
Su (2008). The first one is the dummy variable, DIV, which is coded 1 for a multi-
segment firm and coded 0 for a single-segment firm. The other measure for 
diversification is a sales-based Herfindahl index (HI) defined as below: 
                                                    ܪܫ௜ ൌ ∑ ሺ ௌ஺௅ாௌೖ,೔்௢௧௔௟ሺௌ஺௅ாௌሻ೔ሻ
ଶ௞                             eq.ሺ3.4ሻ	
where ܵܣܮܧܵ௞,௜  refers to the annual sales revenue of sector k in firm i and 
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽሺܵܣܮܧܵሻ௜ represents the yearly total sales revenue of firm i. HI is inversely 
related to the degree of diversification.  
To measure firm value, I use Tobin’s Q (Q), defined as the sum of market 
value of equity8  and book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets 
(Lang and Stulz, 1994; Lin and Su, 2008).  
 
3.3.4 Control variables 
Previous literature has documented alternative explanations for the 
diversification discount and firm value. In this paper, I also include some control 
variables to examine the incremental explanatory power of information asymmetry.  
                                                            
8 A large percentage of total outstanding shares are non-tradable shares in China. I use the sum of the 
net asset value of non-tradable shares and the market capitalization of tradable shares, as the market 
value of equity. 
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A number of studies argue that the type of ownership structure can have an 
impact on firm performance in China because of the complex agency problems and 
soft budget constraints (Sun and Tong, 2003; Wei et al., 2005). Firstly, I include the 
state ownership (STATE) as well as a GOV dummy variable to control for the state 
agency effect. STATE is the percentage of shares held by the state agency while GOV 
is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm is a State Owned Enterprise and coded 0 
otherwise. Firth et al. (2006) indicates that a distinct characteristic of Chinese firms 
is that they have one dominant shareholder whose ownership is much higher than the 
next largest shareholder.  Hence, to control for the influence of ownership structure, I 
include the measure of ownership concentration (SHRCR), which is the ownership of 
the largest shareholder, and the institutional ownership (INS), which is the 
institutional holdings as a percentage of the total number of shares outstanding.  
Because larger firms are more likely to diversify, I use the natural logarithm 
of the market value of equity (SIZE) to capture the effect of size. Based on Clarke et 
al. (2004), I use the annualized standard deviation of daily stock price returns 
(VOLATILITY) to capture the effect of return volatility. As the growth opportunities 
of firms are positively related with firm value (Stowe and Xing, 2006), I use the 
percentage change in total assets (TAGrow) and the ratio of intangible assets to total 
assets (INTANG) to capture the growth of the firms. I use the dummy variable 
(EXCHANGE) to capture the variation across stock exchanges, which is coded 1 if 
the firm is listed on the SHSE and coded 0 if listed on SZSE. In order to capture the 
variation across industries, I include industry dummy variables. According to the 
two-digit industry code of CSRC (China Securities Regulation Commission), 13 
industries are considered. Other control variables include the number of years after 
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the firm went public (AGE), leverage (LEVERAGE) (Doukas and Pantzalis, 2003; 
Clarke et al., 2004), return on assets (ROA) and the year dummies. 
 
3.3.5 Summary statistics 
Table 4 presents the summary statistics of the annual estimates of 
diversification, firm value, and other firm-level and industry-level control variables 
over the period from January 2003 and December 2008. Within the total 1,131 firms 
in the sample, the number of diversified firms increases from 379 in 2003 to 543 in 
2008. Among all the 5,377 firm-years observations, 2,979 are multi-segment firms 
which make up 55% of the total sample. On average, 70% of the total observations 
are controlled by the state and 54% of the total observations are from SHSE. 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
3.4 Preliminary evidence of the effect of diversification on firm performance 
Table 5 shows the correlation analysis of information asymmetry, PIN, and 
the explanatory variables. The results in Table 5 show that the stocks with higher 
information asymmetry (higher PIN) have significantly higher state ownership and 
ownership concentration, and have lower firm size, stock return volatility, growth 
opportunity (lower TAGrow and INTANG), institutional ownership and the numbers 
of years since going public. Table 5 also indicates that diversified firms have smaller 
size, volatility, growth of assets, state ownership, institutional ownership and 
ownership concentration compared to focused firms. The correlation analysis shows 
that it is important to control for these variables when relating PIN to diversification 
and firm valuation.  
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
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Table 6 provides summary statistics for the sample divided into diversified 
and non-diversified firms. As shown in the table, the average Tobin’s Q of non-
diversified firms is significantly higher than that of diversified firms, indicating that 
diversification is value-destroying. Moreover, the average ROA for single-segment 
and multi-segment firms are 0.0525 and 0.044, respectively. The t-statistics for the 
difference in sample means is significant at the 1% level, indicating that diversified 
firms are less profitable. The statistics in Table 6 also show that diversified firms 
differ substantially from focused firms in respect of other variables. In particular, the 
diversified firms overall have significantly lower volatility, growth of assets, state 
ownership, institutional ownership and ownership concentrations; but higher PIN 
measures than focused firms. At the same time, diversified firms are older and 
smaller in terms of firm size than the single segment firms.   
[TABLE 6 HERE] 
In China, most listed firms have a controlling shareholder that influences its 
strategies and policies. The central or regional government is often the ultimate 
owner of the controlling stake. In other cases, the controlling shareholder is a State 
Owned Enterprise or a private blockholder. The different types of controlling 
investor have different objectives and incentives, which will affect the corporate 
decision to diversify. Therefore, I explore the differences in ownership and assess 
their implications for diversification and firm valuation.  
Table 7 partitions the sample along two dimensions: diversified versus non-
diversified and government controlled versus non-government controlled. The means 
of the four sub-samples are presented. For each variable of interest, the top two cells 
are for government-controlled firms, partitioned by whether the firms are diversified 
or not. The lower two cells are for non-government-controlled firms partitioned also 
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by diversification.  Surrounding these four cells are the t-statistics that test for the 
differences in sample means for the rows and columns.  Consistent with Table 6, 
multi-segment firms have significantly lower Tobin’s Q than single-segment firms 
for non-government-controlled firms and lower ROA for the government-controlled 
firms. In comparison, non-government-controlled firms have significantly higher 
Tobin’s Q than government-controlled firms no matter whether they are diversified 
or not.  These results suggest that government control is an important factor when 
testing the effect of diversification on firm value.  However, government control 
exerts a non-significant influence on the PIN variable.  
Table 7 also shows that, after controlling for the identity of the ultimate 
owner, multi-segment firms have lower asset growth, institutional ownership, state 
ownership and ownership concentration but a longer history, than the single-segment 
firms.  Controlling for diversification status, government-controlled firms have 
higher firm size, return on assets, institutional ownership, state ownership, asset 
growth and ownership concentration, but lower stock return volatility and leverage, 
than the non-government-controlled firms. 
[TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
3.5 Regression analysis 
The previous summary statistics and comparisons show that diversified firms 
have lower firm values. However, the cause of the discount needs to be investigated. 
In this section, I test whether information asymmetry can explain the diversification 
discount in firm value. 
 
3.5.1 Econometric specification and testable hypotheses 
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I specify the regression models measuring the interaction between 
information asymmetry and firm diversification discount as follows: 
ܳ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܦܫ ௜ܸ,௧ ൅ ߙଶܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଷܸܱܮܣܶܫܮܫܶ ௜ܻ,௧ ൅ ߙସܶܣܩݎ݋ݓ௜,௧
൅ ߙହܫܰܶܣܰܩ ൅ ߙ଺ܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଻ܵܶܣܶܧ௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଼ܩܱ ௜ܸ,௧
൅ ߙଽܫܰ ௜ܵ,௧ ൅ ߙଵ଴ܵܪܴܥܴ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଵଵܣܩܧ௜,௧
൅෍߮௞
௞
ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ	ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ ൅෍߶௧
௧
ܻ݁ܽݎ	ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ ൅ ߝ௜,௧	
eq.(3.5.1)	
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൅ ߱଺ܫܰܶܣܰܩ ൅ ߱଻ܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௜,௧ ൅ ଼߱ܵܶܣܶܧ௜,௧ ൅ ߱ଽܩܱ ௜ܸ,௧
൅ ߱ଵ଴ܫܰ ௜ܵ,௧ ൅ ߱ଵଵܵܪܴܥܴ௜,௧ ൅	߱ଵଶܣܩܧ௜,௧ 	
൅෍߮௞
௞
ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ	ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ ൅෍߶௧
௧
ܻ݁ܽݎ	ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ ൅ ߝ௜,௧	
eq.(3.5.2)	
The definitions and the estimation details of the variables are discussed in 
section (3.3). I also run the same set of regressions by replacing the dummy variable, 
DIV, by HI that is inversely related with the level of diversification. The two 
regressions are used to test the effect of information asymmetry on the diversification 
discount.  
According to the previous literature, diversification destroys firm value for 
many reasons, such as the inefficient allocation of capital among divisions (Lamont, 
1997; Shin and Stulz, 1998), complete insensitivity of CEO turnover to the stock 
price performance (Berry et al., 2006) and others. Therefore, in eq. (3.5.1), a 
significantly negative α1, indicates that a higher degree of diversification is related 
with a loss of firm value (i.e. a lower Tobin’s Q). According to Habib et al. (1997) 
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and Nanda and Narayanan (1999), diversification could result in a higher level of 
asymmetric information problems, due to the lack of transparency, and, thus, the 
information asymmetry may be the incremental factor that makes diversified firms to 
be valued even less. If this is true, the significant estimate of α1 in eq. (3.5.1) could 
be a reflection of asymmetric information. According to the results in Tables 5 and 6, 
the PIN estimates are positively related with the firms’ diversification decisions.  
Based on the above consideration, I add PIN, as the proxy of information 
asymmetry, in eq. (3.5.2) to test the effect of price informativeness on diversification 
discount. If ω2 is significantly negative related with Tobin’s Q while ω1 is no longer 
significant, I will conclude that information asymmetry directly leads to the 
diversification discount. In other words, diversification does not affect firm value 
directly but affects it through the channel of information asymmetry. Diversified 
firms suffer from a higher level of asymmetric information that leads to the loss of 
firm value. 
Specifically, using the econometric specification in eq.(3.5.1) and (3.5.2), I 
test the following hypothesis: 
H0: α1=0, ω1≠0, or ω2=0. 
H1: α1≠0, ω1=0 and ω2 ≠0. 
 
3.5.2 Regression results 
  Table 8 shows the regression results defined by eq. (3.5.1) and eq. (3.5.2). 
The regression results in the columns (1) and (4) are based on eq. (3.5.1), where the 
diversification is measured by DIV in column (1) and by HI in column (4).  
Accordingly, the results in the columns (2) and (5) are based on eq. (3.5.2) using two 
different proxies of diversification, DIV and HI, respectively. Additionally, I include 
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the interaction terms in columns (3) and (6), DIVൈPIN (HIൈPIN), measure the 
effects of the interplay between diversification and information asymmetry on the 
firm value. Moreover, to control for the causality problem, one-year lagged Tobin’s 
Q is used as the dependent variable in columns (7) and (8) and the regression results 
are defined by eq. (3.5.1) and eq. (3.5.2) too. According to the regression results, 
multi-segment firms have lower Tobin’s Q than single-segment firms, as the 
coefficient estimates for DIV are significantly negative at the 1% level and the 
coefficient estimates for HI are significantly positive at the 5% level. The results are 
consistent with the previous literature that diversification leads to a firm value 
discount using the U.S. data (e.g., Myers and Majluf, 1984; Gilson et al., 2001; 
Jensen, 1986).  
I next test whether the effect of diversification on firm value is subsumed by 
information asymmetry through regression equation (3.5.2). The results are shown in 
the columns (2), (3), (5) and (6), where diversification is measured by DIV in 
columns (2) and (3) and by HI in columns (5) and (6). After adding PIN as an 
explanatory variable for Tobin’s Q, the coefficient estimates for DIV and HI become 
insignificant while the coefficient estimates of PIN are all significantly negative at 
the 1% or 5% level indicating that the increased information asymmetry is directly 
responsible for the diversification discount, however, the diversification strategy 
itself can not destroy firm value. In columns (3) and (6) with the extra interaction 
term, DIV×PIN (HI×PIN) is negatively (positive) significant, indicating that the 
effect of information asymmetry (PIN) on firm value (Q) varies with the 
diversification degree. More specifically, the negative effect of PIN on Q rises as the 
firm’s diversification degree increases. In other words, the more diversified the firm 
is, the greater damage on firm value will be caused by the increased information 
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asymmetry. At the same time, the sign and significance of other variables remain 
similar as before.  
To control the problem of causality, I lag the entire independent variables one 
year in the last two columns and use Qt+1 as the dependent variable. The results are 
consistent with pervious hypothesis, as the coefficient estimate of DIV is negatively 
significant with Q but becomes insignificant after adding PIN as the proxy of 
information asymmetry. The results suggest that the increased information 
asymmetry is responsible for the diversification discount after considering the 
problem of causality.  
 The regression results also show that the government controls reduce a 
firm’s Tobin’s Q as the coefficient estimates for GOV are all significantly negative. 
These results are consistent with the prediction that political influence will detract 
from firm value, and consistent with the analysis in Table 7. On average, firms that 
are smaller in size, older in corporate history, higher institutional ownership, higher 
leverage and lower ownership concentration are related to with higher Tobin’s Q.  
[TABLE 8 HERE] 
In considering the variations of stock exchanges, I divide the sample into 
firms listed on the SHSE and firms listed on the SZSE and check the effect of 
information asymmetry on diversification discount following the above econometric 
specification. The regression results in columns (1) and (3) of Table 9 are based on 
eq. (3.5.1) by using data from the SHSE and the SZSE respectively. According to the 
results, diversified firms have lower Tobin’s Q than non-diversified firms, as the 
coefficient estimates for DIV are significantly negative. This conclusion is consistent 
with the one in Table 8 where the sample includes the whole market. The regression 
results in columns (2) and (4) are based on eq. (3.5.2) using data from the two stock 
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exchanges separately. After adding PIN as an explanatory variable for Tobin’s Q, the 
coefficient estimates of DIV become insignificant while the coefficient estimates of 
PIN are all significantly negative at the 1% level. The results suggest that the 
increased information asymmetry level is responsible for the diversification discount 
which is consistent with the conclusion in Table 8 while the adjusted R-square is 
higher in the SZSE than that in the SHSE. Moreover, I also exclude 251 observations 
with B-shares and investigate the relation between information asymmetry and 
diversification discount by including A-shares only from the whole sample. The 
regression results are shown in columns (5) and (6) of Table 9 and the same 
conclusion is derived from this separated sub-sample that the multi-segment firms 
are valued less due to a higher level of information asymmetry. Therefore, the same 
conclusion is achieved regardless of the stock exchange and the share type. 
 Finally, considering the political influence on the effect of diversification, I 
divide the sample into government-controlled firms versus non-government-
controlled firms and check the effect of information asymmetry on diversification 
discount following the above econometric specification. The regression results are 
shown in columns (7) to (10) of Table 9 and are consistent with previous analysis in 
Table 7 that the government control is an important factor when testing the effect of 
diversification on firm value. As to non-government-controlled firms, the coefficient 
estimate of DIV is significant in column (9) and loses its significance after adding 
PIN in column (10). The fact suggests that not only diversification has an effect on 
the value of non-government-controlled firms, but also the discounted firm value is 
induced by a higher level of information asymmetry. For the government-controlled 
firms, the effect of diversification is less strong compared with non-government-
controlled firms while the information asymmetry level is still significantly negative 
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related with firm value. In addition, the coefficient estimates of other control 
variables in Table 9 are similar to those in Table 8.  
 [TABLE 9 HERE] 
 
3.6 Robustness tests 
To test the robustness of my results, I use a three-step approach to evaluate 
the effect of information asymmetry on the diversification discount. In addition to the 
dummy variable DIV, the continuous variable HI is included as an alternative 
measure of diversification  
 
3.6.1 Econometric Specification 
In this section, I run three regressions to test that after controlling for 
information asymmetry whether diversification has any effect on the firm value 
discount. In the first step, the diversification dummy variable (DIV) is estimated 
against the information asymmetry variable (PIN) and a set of firm-specific and 
industry-specific characteristics, using the following Logit model and a sample 
including 5,377 firm-year observations: 
ܦܫ ௜ܸ,௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܲܫ ௜ܰ,௧ ൅ ߚଶܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଷܸܱܮܣܶܫܮܶ ௜ܻ,௧ ൅ ߚସܶܣܩݎ݋ݓ௜,௧ ൅
																ߚହܫܰܶܣܰܩ௜,௧ ൅ 	ߚ଺ܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௜,௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܵܶܣܶܧ௜,௧ ൅ ߚ଼ܵܪܴܥܴ௜,௧ ൅
																ߚଽܣܩܧ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܧܺܥܪܣܰܩܧ௜,௧ ൅ ∑ ߮௞௞ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ	ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ ൅
																∑ ߶௧௧ ܻ݁ܽݎ	ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ ൅ ߝ௜,௧																																																																						
eq.ሺ3.6ሻ	
The predicted diversification variable DIV෢ ୧,୲ and the regression 
residual	ܴ݁ݏଓ݀෣ ௜,௧ are estimated by the Logit regression in eq. (3.6).  The models use 
the mapping method in econometrics to project DIV into the space combined with 
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PIN and other explanatory variables in the first step. The predicted ܦܫ෢ܸ ௜,௧ from eq. 
(3.6) represents the special part of the original DIV explained by PIN and other 
variables, while the residual, 	ܴ݁ݏଓ݀෣ ௜,௧ , orthogonal to the space of information 
asymmetry, reflect the rest of DIV that is not explained by the regression model of eq. 
(3.6). In the second step, I use ܦܫ෢ܸ ௜,௧ and	ܴ݁ݏଓ݀෣ ௜,௧, respectively, to explain the firm 
value discount in the regressions. The regression model with  ܦܫ෢ܸ ௜,௧  as the 
explanatory variable is as follows:  
						ܳ௜,௧ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵܦܫ෢ܸ ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଶܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଷܸܱܮܣܶܫܮܫܶ ௜ܻ,௧ ൅	ߛସܶܣܩݎ݋ݓ௜,௧ ൅
																		ߛହܫܰܶܣܰܩ௜,௧ ൅ ߛ଺ܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௜,௧ ൅	ߛ଻ܵܶܣܶܧ௜,௧ ൅ ߛ଼ܵܪܴܥܴ௜,௧ ൅
																		ߛଽܣܩܧ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵ଴ܧܺܥܪܣܰܩܧ௜,௧ ൅	∑ ߮௞௞ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ	ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ ൅
																		∑ ߶௧௧ ܻ݁ܽݎ	ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ ൅ ߝ௜,௧																																																																			
eq.ሺ3.7ሻ					 																					
The regression model for Resıd෣ ୧,୲ as the explanatory variable is as follows: 
								ܳ௜,௧ ൌ ߠ଴ ൅ ߠଵܴ݁ݏଓ݀෣ ௜,௧ ൅ ߠଶܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ ൅ ߠଷܸܱܮܣܶܫܮܫܶ ௜ܻ,௧ ൅ 	ߠସܶܣܩݎ݋ݓ௜,௧ ൅
																				ߠହܫܰܶܣܰܩ௜,௧ ൅ ߠ଺ܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௜,௧ ൅ ߠ଻ܵܶܣܶܧ௜,௧ ൅ ߠ଼ܵܪܴܥܴ௜,௧ ൅
																			ߠଽܣܩܧ௜,௧ ൅ ∑ ߮௞௞ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ	ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ ൅ ∑ ߶௧௧ ܻ݁ܽݎ	ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ 																							 			
																																																																																																																																													eq.	ሺ3.8ሻ																									
where Tobin’s Q and all the other variables are the same as specified in section (3.3).  
The primary coefficient of interest in eq. (3.6) is the coefficient on PIN, β1, 
which captures the relationship between stock price informativeness and the firm’s 
diversification. In eq. (3.7) the primary coefficient of interest is the coefficient on 
predicted diversification, γ1, which indicates the influence on firm valuation exerted 
by the projection of diversification explained by eq. (3.6). If γ1 is significantly 
different from 0, the information asymmetry of the diversified firm is responsible for 
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the discount in firm value. At the same time, an insignificant coefficient on the 
residual θ1 in eq.(3.8), indicates that without the effect of PIN, the remaining part of 
diversification does not influence firm value. So my hypothesis is as follows: 
H0: 1 =0, 1 =0 or 1 ≠0 
H1: 1 ≠0, 1 ≠0 and 1 =0 
 
3.6.2 Regression results 
Table 10 presents the regression results of eq. (3.6), (3.7) and (3.8). From 
columns (1) and (4), the variable, PIN, is positively (negatively) related with DIV 
(HI) indicating that diversified firms have higher information asymmetry compared 
with single-focus firms. As shown in the table, the coefficient estimates for DIV෢ ୧,୲  are 
significantly negative (positive) at the 1% level in column (2) (column (4)), 
providing strong evidence that the lower firm value stems from the higher 
information asymmetry level after diversification. The more diversified the firms are, 
the higher the level of information asymmetry they will suffer and, in turn, the firm 
will be valued less by investors due to the lower transparency implied by higher PIN.  
At the same time, the coefficient estimates, ܴ݁ݏଓ݀෣ ௜,௧ , are not significant at all no 
matter whether the diversification is estimated by DIV or HI, as shown in columns (3) 
and (6). So diversification cannot affect the value of the firms without the effect of 
information asymmetry. When it comes to other explanatory variables, on average, 
firms with higher ratio of intangible assets, lower institutional ownership and lower 
ownership concentration are more diversified. And listed firms in the SHSE are more 
diversified compared with those in the SZSE as the coefficient estimate of 
EXCHANGE is significantly positive (negative) in the 1% level in column (1) 
(column (4)). Moreover, firms that are smaller in size, older in corporate history, 
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higher institutional ownership, higher leverage and lower ownership concentration 
are associated with higher Tobin’s Q according to the evidence provided in columns 
(2), (3), (5) and (6).   
[TABLE 10 HERE] 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter analyzes the relation between corporate diversification and 
information asymmetry and their effects on firm value, using the data in China from 
2003 to 2008.  
I estimate PIN as a proxy of information asymmetry for 1,869 firms traded on 
the two stock exchanges in China. As predicted, the PIN estimates are higher in 
China than those found in the U.S. and European countries. First, diversified firms 
exhibit higher levels of asymmetric information than focused firms. This finding is 
consistent with the transparency theory suggested by Thomas (2002). 
Second, compared with single-focus firms, multi-segment firms have lower 
Tobin’s Q after controlling for other firm-specific factors, including firm size, stock 
price volatility, growth opportunities, ownership structures and others. Therefore, 
Chinese firms exhibit a diversification discount, as found by Gilson et al. (2001) for 
U.S. data. 
The main question of the study is to find out whether diversification affects 
firm value directly or indirectly through information asymmetry. Consistent with my 
hypothesis, information asymmetry, resulting from corporate diversification, leads to 
the firm value discount. The rationale is that corporate diversification results in a 
higher level of asymmetric information, and therefore the loss of firm value for 
diversified firms is attributed to the more severe asymmetric information problems. 
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After controlling for PIN, the remaining diversification cannot explain the changes in 
firm value. If asymmetric information problems are well controlled or managed, the 
cost of diversification will be reduced significantly. 
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Chapter 4. Information asymmetry and managerial incentives: evidence from 
China’s stock market 
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter marries a study of market microstructure and an important 
corporate governance issue. In particular, I examine the relation between the level of 
information asymmetry and managerial incentives sensitivity. 
The conflict of interest between shareholders and the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) is a classic topic in agency theory (Murphy, 1999; Haubrich, 1994). A 
shareholder’s goal is to maximize firm value, which is positively correlated with his 
own wealth. However, as a risk-averse individual, a CEO usually takes conservative 
actions that consider his private interests, which may hurt shareholders’ interests. If 
shareholders can obtain complete information about a CEO’s behavior and a firm’s 
investment opportunities, they can construct an optimal managerial contract to drive 
the CEO’s actions towards the principal’s benefits. However, it is impossible for the 
corporate board members to directly and completely monitor a CEO’s activities. 
Usually the CEO has much better information than shareholders in identifying what 
actions are optimal for firm performance. It is costly for shareholders to monitor 
management directly. However, the principals (i.e., shareholders, board of directors) 
could acquire extra information from the stock price to increase their knowledge 
about managerial activities. On the one hand, the need for optimal incentive 
contracting requires the principals to gather and analyze all useful information 
including the important information revealed from the stock market. On the other 
hand, according to Kang and Liu (2008), informative stock prices also send 
meaningful signals to financial markets about the need for better corporate 
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governance, which will force the principals to better incentivize managers. In this 
chapter, I examine the role of information-based trading in affecting executive 
incentives using data from China. 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) analytically show that the principal can use 
inferred information from the stock market to design a more effective compensation 
contract. Kang and Liu (2008) empirically test the effect of information asymmetry 
on managerial incentives using U.S. data. They use the probability of information 
trading (PIN) and analyst earnings forecasts as the proxies of information asymmetry 
and use stock-option based pay-performance sensitivity (PPS hereafter) to reflect the 
managerial incentives. Consequently, they find a positive relation between PPS and 
the proxies of information asymmetry. In contrast, Subrahmanyam (2008) suggests 
that more stock price informativeness will induce poorer corporate governance in the 
U.S. market.  
Using data from China, I focus on testing the prediction that information 
asymmetry is positively related with CEO’s compensation incentives. The analysis 
uses high frequency data from firms listed in China’s stock market to estimate the 
level of asymmetric information or stock price informativeness. Information 
asymmetry is measured by the probability of information trading (PIN), developed 
by Easley et al. (1996, 1997a, 1997b). A higher PIN implies a greater amount of 
private information reflected in the stock market. I find that the PIN in China is much 
higher than in the U.S., indicating more serious asymmetric information problems in 
China. To measure the magnitude of the incentives provided by the compensation 
policy, I use a CEO’s pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) as a proxy (Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990). The mean of the pay-performance sensitivity in China is 1.69, 
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representing a 1.69 RMB increase in CEO compensation per 1000 RMB increase in 
shareholders’ value.  
Using both panel data regressions with fixed effects and the median regressions, 
I find that firms with higher PINs exert more efficient and stronger incentives on the 
CEO and make them tie their wealth to the benefits of shareholders. In other words, 
there is a positive relation between PIN and PPS, after controlling for firm-specific 
characteristics. Thomas (2002) uses the accuracy of consensus forecasts and the 
dispersion among forecasts as proxies for asymmetric information. To further check 
the endogeneity problem in corporate governance, I use the error and dispersion of 
the analysts’ forecasts as instrumental variables and find that the relationship 
between PIN and managerial pay-performance sensitivity is still significantly 
positive. 
China offers a unique economic and financial environment to address this 
issue. First of all, China’s financial markets are less fully developed and are largely 
segmented from the rest of the world.  Lin and Su (2008) suggest China’s financial 
market is characterized by a lack of reliable information and a high degree of 
information asymmetry. In addition, the Chinese government desires to retain some 
control over large firms. That is why most listed firms in China have a controlling 
shareholder, which is the central or regional government. Political influence may 
affect the development of listed firms in many ways, such as the appointment of the 
CEO, the executive compensation structure, and its information asymmetry. 
Accordingly, I examine whether the information from stock trading can affect 
managerial incentives of firms listed in China. 
The results of my findings have useful implications and economic significance 
as follows: firstly and most importantly, I show the impacts of information-based 
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trading on executive incentives. As long as the trading process can impound more 
information into stock prices, the principal is able to incentivize managers with the 
tool of performance-related pay. However, many people argue that executives might 
be rewarded regardless of the profit of shareholders, especially in China. The results 
show that the principal can better structure managerial incentives if they use the 
information contained in stock prices and ensure that the CEO works consistently 
towards the goals of the shareholders.  
Secondly, my paper adds to the literature on executive compensation from a 
special angle. Although executive compensation has been studied widely (e.g., 
Lambert et al., 1991; Hayes, 2004; Dittman and Maug, 2007), the linkage of a CEO’s 
compensation to market microstructure has been barely studied. I fill in this void in 
the literature by empirically testing the effect of information asymmetry on 
managerial incentives.  
Thirdly, my paper is closely related to the literature on the effect of information 
asymmetry. Using the probability of informed trading, PIN, as the proxy, Chen et al. 
(2007) find the degree of information asymmetry is negatively correlated with the 
sensitivity of investment to stock price. Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004) indicate 
that shareholders will be incentivized to engage in value-increasing activities if more 
information is incorporated into stock prices. Easley et al. (1998) investigate the 
informational role of financial analysts and find that there is no significant relation 
between the analyst coverage and the probability of informed trading. 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I introduce the 
background literature. In Section 3, I describe the data sample and the variables. 
Section 4 provides the main results. Section 5 includes a robustness test controlling 
for the endogeneity problem. Section 6 concludes with a summary of the findings.  
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4.2 Literature Review 
The large academic literature has explored extensively the information 
asymmetry revealed from the trading actions of investors. On one hand, some 
research focuses on the determinants of asymmetric information theoretically and 
empirically (e.g., Easley et al., 1998; Aslan et al., 2008; Bardong et al., 2009). In 
summary, information asymmetry measures in the U.S. are shown to be significantly 
and positively related with trading volumes, return on assets and negatively related 
with firm size, firm age and Tobin’s Q. The estimated PINs are also shown to be 
higher for firms in the industries of Oil and Petroleum Products, Construction, 
Textiles and Retail in the U.S. market (Aslan et al., 2008). In a search for the factors 
leading to information asymmetry, studies focus on some particular firm-specific 
factors. Also for the U.S. market, Brown et al. (2009) find that information 
asymmetry decreases (increases) immediately following positive (negative) earnings 
surprises. Borisova and Yadav (2010) apply the measures of information asymmetry 
to firms in European Union and find that firms in which the government still retains a 
stake after privatization exhibit a lower level of information asymmetry than do the 
fully privatized peer firms.  
Another stream of the literature examines information risk in asset pricing. 
Easley et al. (2002) consider the effect of information asymmetry on the required 
stock returns and find that stocks in the U.S. market with higher PINs consistently 
generate higher excess returns than those with lower PINs. The price risk of 
information asymmetry is also tested for the stocks traded in China. Chan et al. (2008) 
show that the measures of information asymmetry explain a significant portion of the 
cross-sectional variation in the foreign share discounts. Therefore, foreign investors 
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demand a higher rate of return as compensation for bearing a higher information risk 
when investing stocks in China. Extending research on U.S. stocks to the A-shares 
traded on the SHSE, Copeland et al. (2009) find that the PINs significantly explain 
the returns even after controlling for the Fama-French (1992) three factors9. 
In this chapter, I use the estimated PIN as my proxy of stock price 
informativenss to explain the variations in managerial incentives cross-sectionally. 
The higher PIN is, the more effective the compensation policy can be in inducing 
managerial incentives. One of the possible explanations is that, in the stock market, 
an informed party, as described by Kim and Verrechia (1994), represents a group of 
well-informed investors that possess a heightened ability to analyze publicly 
available data to convert them into private information, and can take advantage of the 
non-public information and profit from it. According to Grossman and Stigliz (1980), 
individuals who expend resources searching for additional information will receive 
compensation. Thus, they have an incentive to spend resources to collect signals 
about the firm's fundamental value. The information is incorporated into the stock 
price through trading. As a result, the increased information flow into the market 
improves stock price informativeness, which enables firms to design more efficient 
managerial contracts. Hence, the information content of stock prices can have an 
important effect on the pay-performance sensitivity of managerial compensation. 
Kang and Liu (2010) suggest that the information-based stock trading that enhances 
managerial incentives is driven by the increased uncertainty of an economy. 
Until the 1990s, relatively little research had been done in the area of the role 
of stock market information production in optimal contracting. Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1993) helped fill the gap by studying the value of the stock market as a 
                                                            
9 A similar study by Lu and Wong (2008) finds that information risk is priced for the stocks traded in 
Taiwan stock exchange.  
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monitor of managerial performance. They argue that stock prices impound 
performance information which is useful for constructing the CEO’s compensation 
incentives. After receiving or interpreting the non-public financial market signals, the 
shareholders will put more effort into monitoring. At the same time, the informative 
stock price can also provide messages to the market about the current corporate 
governance status, and tell investors whether it needs to be improved or even be 
reconstructed. Kang and Liu (2008) empirically examine Holmstrom and Tirole’s 
model using 10 years’ of U.S. data from 1992 to 2002. They show that the CEO’s 
pay-performance sensitivity is positively and significantly correlated with PIN and 
other estimates of information asymmetry. They also find that the impact of stock 
price informativeness on the compensation sensitivity is much larger for the CEO 
than for non-CEO executives. In contrast, using U.S. data, Subrahmanyam (2008) 
finds that more informativeness will induce poorer governance. His explanation is 
that high stock market liquidity may attract too many short-term speculators who 
have little vested interest in good governance. However, the negative correlation 
between market liquidity and corporate governance exists only in 1990s, whereas in 
later years, it is not significant. Jensen and Murphy (1990) point out that when a 
board of directors has good information, the pay-performance sensitivity may be 
small. Nevertheless, their statement assumes that the boards observe and monitor 
CEO’s activities directly. Unfortunately, this is not the case in real world. Apart from 
the impact from market microstructure on corporate governance, Chung et al. (2010) 
empirically investigate the relation inversely. They examine how corporate policy 
affects stock market liquidity and PIN is one of their liquidity measures. The results 
indicate that poor (good) governance gives rise to greater (less) information 
asymmetry between the insider and the outside owners, and furthermore amplify 
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(mitigate) the information asymmetries among all market participants. Lipsom (2003) 
provides a brief overview of the importance of the links between market 
microstructure research and corporate governance. He suggests two paths for 
researchers to proceed: one is to use empirical methods in market microstructure that 
can be used to evaluate theories in corporate finance; the other is to examine the 
influence of market microstructure outcomes on corporate decisions.  
 
4.3 Data and variables 
This section shows the data selection as well as the methodology that I 
employ to construct measures of information asymmetry, estimates of managerial 
incentives and the control variables. 
4.3.1 Data 
The intraday data used to estimate PIN are extracted from the high frequency 
database of SinoFin, and consist of all time-stamped trades and quotes from January 
2002 to December 2008 for A-(local) and B-(foreign) shares traded on the SHSE and 
SZSE in China. Following Chan et al. (2008), I exclude the days when trading was 
halted (i.e. when shares reach the price limit of a 10% change with respect to the 
previous day’s close price), and those trading days with less than 100 transactions, 
and I exclude the first and last fifteen minutes of each trading session during the day. 
Following Easley et al. (2002), we require a minimum of 60 trading days in one year.  
The sample initially includes 1,910 firms that are listed on both the SHSE and 
the SZSE for both A-shares and B-shares from 2002 to 2009. The Chinese executive 
compensation data are drawn from the Corporate Governance database of China 
Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR). The stock return data, accounting 
information and industrial sector data are from the Wind Financial Database 
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(WindDB) as well as the CSMAR database. I exclude the observations in 2002 when 
the data of the corporate ownership concentration are not available. Due to the 
unavailability of some financial data, the final sample consists of 6,113 firm-year 
observations from 2003 to 2008.  
 
4.3.2 Measuring Information Asymmetry  
Information asymmetry is estimated according to the microstructure model 
proposed in a series of papers by Easley et al. (1996, 1997a, 1997b), which provides 
a measure of the probability of information based trading PIN. In their model, 
marketmakers, through observing market data, update their beliefs of the probability 
of the trade based on private information and then set the new price. Therefore, over 
time stock prices converge to the true value of an asset (i.e. the firm) and reflect full 
information. The model of PIN allows us to make inferences of the unobservable 
informed trading using the observable trade and quotation data.  
According to the setting of the model, a new information event occurs at the 
beginning of a trading day with a probability of α. If the event occurs, good news 
happens with a probability of (1-δ) and bad news happens with a probability of δ. 
Whether there is new information at the beginning of the trading day and whether the 
news is good or bad are chosen by nature. Throughout the trading day, trades are 
assumed to arrive following Poisson processes. Orders from informed traders arrive 
at a rate of μ (only on information event days). Informed traders buy if the event is 
good and otherwise sell. Buy orders from uninformed traders arrive at a rate of εb, 
and sell orders from uninformed traders arrive at a rate of εs. Easley et al. (1996, 
1997a, 1997b) show that the unobservable parameter set, θ=(α, δ, μ, εb, εs ), reflecting 
the information structure of trades, can be estimated via maximum likelihood. 
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For a single trading day i, the likelihood function is:  
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where Bi and Si denote respectively the total number of buyer-initiated and seller-
initiated trades for day i and  θ=(α, δ, μ, εb, εs ) is the parameter vector.  
Assuming that trading days are independent, Easley et al. (2002) give the 
likelihood function for a period of I trading days as follows:  
                 																																ܮሺߠ|ܯሻ ൌ ∏ ܮሺߠ|ܤ௜, ௜ܵሻூ௜ୀଵ 																					݁ݍ. ሺ3.2ሻ                          
where )),(),...,,((M 11 ii SBSB represents the dataset during the I trading days. 
Maximizing (3.2) by using the dataset M can provide the estimates of the parameters.  
The probability that the trade is information-based, PIN, is derived as follows: 
																																										ܲܫܰ ൌ ߙߤߙߤ ൅ ߝ௕ ൅ ߝ௦ 																												݁ݍ. ሺ3.3ሻ 
where αμ is the daily arrival of informed trades and (αμ+εb+εs) is the arrival of both 
informed and uninformed trades. The PIN variables provide a direct measure of the 
risk derived from information-based trading and reflect the level of information 
asymmetry. PIN has been widely applied to the stocks in different countries over 
different time periods for various research questions in the previous literature10.  
                                                            
10 The PIN estimates have been applied to the stocks listed in the NYSE that operates with a specialist 
system [see Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002), Bardong et al. (2009) and others].  It has also been 
applied by other researchers to stock markets that are order-driven without marketmakers. For 
example, Borisova and Yadav (2008) use PIN for stocks in European countries; Copeland et al. (2009) 
and Chan et al. (2010) use PIN for stocks in mainland China; and Lu and Wong (2008) use PIN for 
stocks in Taiwan stock market. In an order-driven market, the uninformed trader, similar to a 
marketmaker in the specialist system, serves as the liquidity provider to the liquidity demander who is 
an informed trader. 
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In order to estimate PIN, the daily number of buys (Bi) and sells (Si) are 
required. However, the dataset records the intraday trades and quotations without 
showing whether each trade is initiated by a buy or a sell. Following Easley et al. 
(2002), I use the standard Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to classify the trades as 
buys or sells. The algorithm classifies any trade with a trading price higher (lower) 
than the immediate midpoint of the bid and ask as a buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) 
trade. For a trade happening at the midpoint, it is classified as a buy (sell) if its price 
is higher (lower) than the most recent but different trading price11. Following Lee and 
Ready (1991), I adopt a five-second lag of the recorded quotation time to adjust for 
the difference between the recording times of the trades and of the quotes. 
The maximization of the likelihood function, (3.2), starts from self-selected 
starting values for the five parameters. Following Yan and Zhang (2010), Venter and 
Jongh (2004) and Borisova and Yadav (2010), I specify 125 sets of starting values 
for the five parameters. The maximization is performed based on each set of the 
acceptable starting values and then the one that achieves convergence and generates 
the highest value of the likelihood function is used. 
Table 2 provides the summary statistics of the annual estimates of PIN and its 
parameter measures for all shares traded on the SHSE and SZSE during the period 
from January 2002 to December 2008. Panel A presents the statistics of PIN. Overall, 
the mean (median) PIN is 0.23 (0.22) and the standard deviation is 0.08. The average 
estimate of PIN across all firms is 0.215 in 2002 and it remains at a relatively high 
level in the following four years. In 2007 and 2008, there is a substantial reduction in 
the average PIN. One possible explanation is that starting from the bull market in 
2006, more uninformed investors join the financial market. In that case, the arrival 
                                                            
11 If the trading price equals the previous trading price, I will revert to additional lags. The maximum 
number of lags is two in our study. 
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rates of uninformed investors (both buyers and sellers) substantially increase. This 
explanation is supported by evidence from the average arrival rates of uninformed 
buyers (εb) and sellers (εs), which are respectively 73.91 and 78.65 in 2006, and are 
almost tripled up to 232.32 and 240.71 in 2007. The arrival rate of informed 
investors (μ) increases too but at a lower percentage rate from 2006 to 2007. In 
addition to the stimulus from the bull market, the reform of non-tradable shares 
12could also attract individual investors to join the market and then raise the arrival 
rate of uninformed investors after 2006. By the end of 2006, 1,301 listed companies 
on mainland markets have undergone or already completed their non-tradable share 
reforms, accounting for 97 percent of the total companies that need to be reformed. 
The aim of the reform is to change the situation of two kinds of stocks and pricings 
co-existing in the same market and to strengthen the common interests of all 
shareholders. In other words, it protects the interests of individual investors and 
makes the financial markets more attractive to them. Therefore, the reform of non-
tradable shares is probably responsible for the higher arrival rate of uninformed 
investors and lower PIN in 2007 and 2008. However, since there is no data precisely 
capture the process of each firm in its reform of non-shares, we can not empirically 
evaluate the effect of this reform towards my results. Moreover, the average PIN in 
the SZSE is significantly higher than the one for the SHSE at the 5% level. 
Panel B in Table 2 shows the statistics of the estimated parameters that are 
used to calculate PIN over the entire sample period. The mean (median) of α, the 
                                                            
12Not all the shares in a company incorporated in China that are listed on a stock exchange are freely 
tradable. The split share structure of the Chinese public securities market refers to the existence of a 
large amount of non-tradable shares, including state-owned shares and legal person shares of a listed 
Chinese company. Only about one-third of the shares in a listed Chinese company are freely tradable. 
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 2005 published the guidance notes on the 
split share structure reform of listed companies or the reform of non-tradable shares. The reform is 
designed to float the non-tradable legal person shares through the open market. Such legal person 
shares could, under the reform program, be converted to tradable A-shares. The converted A-shares 
are subject to a lockup period. 
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probability of an information event in a day, is 0.287 (0.266), and the mean (median) 
δ is 0.362 (0.227), indicating that most of the information is good news.    
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
According to Chan et al. (2008), the average level of the PIN estimate is 
higher for the B-shares than for the A-shares due to the small amount of uninformed 
trades in the B-shares market. I analyze firms that have both A-shares and B-shares 
in one sample. In Table 3, the PIN statistics of B-shares versus the corresponding A-
shares are presented. The differences in PIN between A-shares and B-shares are not 
consistently positive or negative over years. In most years, the PIN estimate is higher 
for B-shares than the A-shares, because the PIN parameters, εb and εs, are 
significantly higher for A-shares than for B-shares. The difference in εb and εs 
between A-shares and B-shares are significantly and positively different from zero at 
the 1% level for all years in both exchanges. As pointed out by Chan et al. (2008), 
the higher information asymmetry in the B-shares market is attributed to the 
relatively low number of uninformed trades. However, the PIN estimate and its 
parameters in my study are not directly comparable to those in Chan et al. (2008). 
They focus on the event when Chinese citizens are allowed to trade B-shares in 
March 2001 using the monthly PIN from January 2000 to November 2001, while my 
data start from 2002.  
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
Lin and Su (2008) claims that China’s financial markets are less fully 
developed and largely segmented from the rest of the world. They are characterized 
by a lack of reliable information and a high degree of information asymmetry. 
Comparing my estimates with the estimates of PIN in other regions, the Chinese 
firms are shown to have a higher level of information asymmetry. In Easley et al. 
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(2002), the mean, median and maximum of PIN in the U.S. from 1983 to 1998, are 
respectively 0.191, 0.185 and 0.530. In Taiwan, the PIN statistics from 1997 to 2005, 
reported by Lu and Wong (2008), have a mean of 0.20 and a median of 0.18. 
Different from our study, Copeland et al. (2009) estimate the monthly PIN in the 
SHSE from 2001 to 2006 and find an average of 0.114.  
 
4.3.3 Measuring CEO incentives 
Appropriate compensation that ties the CEO’s welfare to the shareholders’ 
interests gives the manager incentives to select and implement actions that maximize 
shareholders’ wealth (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). An increase of managerial 
ownership also contributes to the improvement in firm performance (Core and 
Larcker, 2002). I employ the pay-performance sensitivity to measure the 
appropriateness of the reward structures to top managers. According to Jensen and 
Murphy (1990), I define the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) as the RMB change 
in the CEO’s wealth associated with a 1000 RMB change in the shareholders’ wealth, 
as follows: 
														ܲܲ ௜ܵ௧ ൌ ቆܱܹ ௜ܰ,௧ିଵ ൅ ∆
ሺܥܧܱ	݌ܽݕ௥௘௟௔௧௘ௗܹ݈݁ܽݐ݄ሻ௜,௧
∆ሺ݄ܵܽݎ݄݁݋݈݀݁ݎ	ܹ݈݁ܽݐ݄ሻ௜,௧ ቇ ൈ 1000								݁ݍ. ሺ4.1ሻ 
where OWNi,t-1 measures the change of CEO's wealth from the stock ownership and 
other pay-related wealth including the basic salary and bonus in firm i at the end of 
time t-1. The change in shareholder wealth is defined as rtVt-1, where rt is the rate of 
return on common stock realized in year t, and Vt-1 is the firm value at the end of the 
previous year.   
The pay-performance sensitivity measures the impact of a change in equity 
value on the manager’s wealth.  Higher pay-performance sensitivity can drive a CEO 
to work harder to achieve higher profits and efficiency and to increase the market 
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value of the firm for the shareholders’ benefit (Firth et al., 2006). Hall and Liebman 
(1998) and Murphy (1999) show that in the U.S., the pay-performance sensitivity in 
the compensation structure is mostly driven by the value changes of CEO holdings of 
stock and stock options13. Hence, it is necessary to include the stock ownership of 
CEO in the firm to capture the effect of stock price on the managerial compensation.  
 
4.3.4 Control Variables 
A set of control variables are included to incorporate the characteristics of the 
firms and the CEOs. According to Firth et al. (2006), ownership structure plays a 
strong effect on the managerial incentives in China. Most listed firms have a 
controlling shareholder in China, the central or regional government, or a State 
Owned Enterprise (Lin and Su, 2008). According to Firth et al. (2006), when the 
State is the dominant owner or the largest shareholder, CEO pay is less constrained 
by firm performance in China. To control for the political influence from the 
government, I include a dummy variable, GOV, that is coded 1 if the firm is a SOE 
and coded 0 otherwise. I also include the state ownership (STATE) to capture the 
government effects, which is the percentage of shares held by the state agency. To 
control for other influences of ownership structure, I include the measure of 
ownership concentration (SHRZ), which is defined as the ownership of the largest 
shareholder over that of the second largest shareholder. Firth et al. (2006) states that 
a distinct characteristic of Chinese firms is that they have one dominant shareholder 
whose ownership is much higher than the next largest shareholder.   
According to the model of Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) and Hartzell and 
Starks (2003), institutional ownership is strongly related with the pay-performance 
                                                            
13 Recent research studies on the U.S companies also include stock options to the CEO’s pay-related 
wealth. However, I ignore the stock options in our study because the option data for the CEO’s 
compensation in China are not fully disclosed.  
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sensitivity of executive compensation since institutional investors are better at 
monitoring executive behavior. Hence, I include the institutional ownership (INS) 
variable to control for this monitoring effect, which is the total institutional 
shareholding as a percentage of the total number of shares outstanding. Schaefer 
(1998) models the relation between firm size and pay-performance sensitivity and 
provides evidence that pay-performance sensitivity declines with firm size.  
Accordingly, firm size (SIZE) is included, which is measured as the natural logarithm 
of market value of equity. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) shows that stock return 
volatility (VOLATILITY) can be considered as noise that increases the monitoring 
cost. I therefore include the annualized stock volatility, which is the standard 
deviation of daily stock price returns. To measure a firm’s performance, I calculate 
Tobin’s Q (Q) as the ratio of the market value of equity plus book value of total debts 
divided by the book value of assets. I also include the return on assets (ROA), which 
is defined as the net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operation 
divided by total assets. To capture the variation across industries, I include industry 
dummy variables to test the industry effects on managerial incentives. According to 
the two-digit industry code of CSRC (China Securities Regulation Commission), 13 
industries are considered. Other control variables are CEO’s tenure, CEO’s age and 
year dummies.  
 
4.3.5 Summary Statistics 
Table 11 shows the descriptive statistics of the annual estimates of executive 
incentives measures and other control variables. The mean and median values of the 
pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) are RMB1.69 and RMB1.72, respectively. 
Compared with the average level of PPS, $40.79, in the U.S. market, as shown by 
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Kang and Liu (2008), the managerial pay-performance sensitivity in China is much 
lower. As for the compensation package, the executives in international listed firms 
usually receive four types of economic rewards. The first one is the basic salary, 
which refers to the fixed remuneration not associated with job performance. The 
second one is the annual income, including non-cash welfare benefits, allowances, 
tax benefits and pension. The third one is short-term incentive, primarily refers to the 
annual bonus which is associated with firm performance. The last one is the long-
term incentive payouts, refers to stock options and restricted stock. In China, listed 
companies have adopted the Annual Salary System in general, consisting of salary 
and bonus mainly. Since 2006, the executive stock option schemes were carried out 
gradually for long-term managerial incentive14. According to the statistics in Table 
11, comparing the two different components of PPS, the basic salary and bonus are 
obviously more influential, since the average CASH_PPS is 1.22 taking up 72% of 
the overall pay-performance sensitivity. Meanwhile, the average PPS from CEO’s 
stock ownership is next to zero. The results are consistent with the previous 
explanation of the Annual Salary System adopted by China’s listed firms. In my 
sample, among the total 6,113 firm-year observations, around 70% (4340) of them 
belong to State Owned Enterprises and the mean value of the state ownership for the 
whole sample is 30%.  At the same time, the averages of the institutional ownership 
and the ownership concentration are 15.53 and 19.17. The average age and tenure of 
                                                            
14In 2005, the CSRC launched a reform of non-tradable shares, which was accompanied by a series of 
changes in the Corporate Law and Security Law. It paved the way for granting stock options to 
executives. Effective from 2006, the new rule allow publicly traded firms that have successfully 
completed structural reforms to offer stock options or restricted stocks to their higher management, 
board and supervisory board members, excluding independent board members, CSRC (2005). Hence, 
there is no use of the stock options in managerial incentives in China before 2006. Firth et al. (2006) 
also indicates another reason that the listed companies reject the options incentive. It suggests that 
CEO’s turnover in China is so frequent that the executives can not exercise their options in their 
tenure. Moreover, the return on options is related with macro economy to some extent, such as the 
economic policy and the trade policy, rather than the manager's efforts, which finally reduce the effect 
of long-term incentive.  
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the CEOs in China are respectively 45.78 and 2.83, which are lower than the findings 
for the CEOs in the U.S., as shown by Kang and Liu (2008), where the average age is 
55.07 and the average tenure is 7.67.  
[TABLE 11 HERE] 
In China, most listed firms have a controlling shareholder that influences its 
strategies and policies, including the compensation structures. Central or regional 
government is often the ultimate owner of the controlling stake. In other cases, the 
controlling shareholder is a SOE or a private blockholder. The different types of 
controlling investor may have different incentive structure for the CEO. According to 
Firth et al. (2006), when the State is the controlling shareholder, CEO pay does not 
depend on firm performance. In contrast, when the largest shareholder is SOE or 
private blockholder, CEO pay is positively related with the accounting performance 
and stock returns. Therefore, I explore the differences in ownership and assess their 
implications for compensation policy.  
Table 12 partitions the sample into two parts: government controlled versus 
non-government controlled firms. Consistent with previous analysis, Table 12 shows 
that the average PPS for government-controlled firms and non-government-
controlled firms are 1.68 and 1.69, respectively. The t-statistics for the difference in 
sample means is significant at the 10% level, indicating that the CEO’s pay-
performance sensitivity in State Owned Enterprises is lower compared with private 
firms. The statistics of the other variables in Table 12 also show that government-
controlled firms differ substantially from non-government-controlled firms in China. 
In particular, the state owned firms overall have significantly lower stock price 
volatility and Tobin’s Q; but larger firm size, higher institutional ownership, higher 
ownership concentration and higher ROA than private firms. Meanwhile, CEOs in 
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government-controlled firms are older and have greater working tenure. These results 
indicate that government control is an important factor for the corporate structure, 
firm value and the tenure of the CEO.  
[TABLE 12 HERE] 
 
4.4 Regression Analysis 
In this section I present the main results on the relation between the CEO 
compensation incentives and the probability of informed trading (PIN) for firms 
listed in China. 
 
4.4.1 Econometric specification and hypotheses 
I specify the regression model measuring the relation between information 
asymmetry and CEO’s compensation sensitivity as follows: 
      ܲܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܲܫ ௜ܰ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଶܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଷܸܱܮܣܶܫܮܫܶ ௜ܻ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߙସܳ௜,௧ିଵ ൅
																						ߙହܴܱܣ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ଺ܵܶܣܶܧ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ଻ܩܱ ௜ܸ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ଼ܩܱ ௜ܸ,௧ିଵ ൈ ܲܫ ௜ܰ,௧ିଵ ൅
																						ߙଽܫܰ ௜ܵ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଵ଴ܵܪܴܼ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଵଵܣܩܧ௜,௧ିଵ ൅	ߙଵଶܶܧܷܴܰܧ௜,௧ିଵ ൅
																							∑ ߮௞௞ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ	ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ ൅ ∑ ߶௧௧ ܻ݁ܽݎ	ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ ൅ ߝ௜,௧                     			 	
																																																																																																																																									eq.	ሺ4.2ሻ						
where PPS refers to the CEO’s pay-performance sensitivity defined in eq. (4.1),  and 
PIN stands for the probability of informed trading, measuring the amount of private 
information available in stock market. The rest are the control variables, as described 
in section (4.3). The independent variables are lagged one year compared to the 
dependent variables, in order to test how these variables affect the compensation 
contracting in the following year. The interaction term, GOVൈPIN, measures the 
effect of the interplay between government control and information asymmetry on 
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the CEO’s pay-performance sensitivity. Under the econometric specification in eq. 
(4.2), I test the following hypothesis: 
H0: 1 =0. 
H1: 1 >0. 
The coefficient 1  captures the influence of information asymmetry on 
incentives. A higher PIN indicates that more private information is revealed from 
stock market trading. Shareholders tend to spend more time and resources on 
monitoring the firm, which in turn, will increase the CEO’s pay-performance 
sensitivity. I therefore expect a positive 1 which indicates a positive relation 
between the PIN and the CEO’s pay-performance sensitivity. 
  
4.4.2 Regression results 
I use panel data regression to evaluate the influence of information asymmetry 
on managerial incentives. Since my data sample is long enough with 7 years, fixed-
effect estimation is carried out to control for the time variation in cross-section units. 
Table 13 presents the regression results of eq. (4.2).  
According to the summary statistics, some of the PPS is unexpectedly negative, 
indicating that the CEO’s wealth declines although the wealth of shareholders 
increases. To limit the effect of such firms, the regression model defined by eq. (4.2) 
is also estimated by using the sample including only positive PPS, and the results are 
shown under the columns with a title of PPS+. In Table 13, columns (1) and (2) are 
the results for the whole sample while columns (5) and (6) are for those with positive 
PPS.  I also examine the relationship between PIN and PPS separately for the two 
different components of CEO’s compensation package. In columns (3) and (4) of 
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Table 13, the stock ownership based and the salary and bonus based pay-
performance sensitivity are included as the dependent variables respectively.   
Table 13 shows how the CEO incentives respond to the probability of informed 
trading (PIN), after control for general firm-specific characteristics and corporate 
ownership structure. The estimated coefficients on the PIN measure (α1) are all 
significantly positive in most columns, confirming the effect of PIN on a CEO’s pay-
performance sensitivity. Nevertheless, the increase of adjusted R-square in columns 
(5) and (6) indicate that PIN is better in explaining the firm’s pay-performance 
sensitivity when the firm’s managerial compensation is positively related to 
shareholders’ wealth. However, the managerial incentives from CEO’s stock holding 
itself can not be effected by the market microstructure since the coefficient estimates 
of PIN is insignificant in column (3) where OWN_PPS is the dependent variable. 
One possible explanation leads to this inconsistent result is that the stock ownership 
takes up less than 30% of the total compensation package which is much less 
influential than the compensation from basic salary and bonus. Accordingly, the 
salary and bonus based PPS is highly related with information asymmetry as the 
coefficient estimate of CASH_PPS is significantly positive in column (4). Therefore, 
CEO’s salary and bonus is a considerable part of the executive compensation 
package in China and it drives the overall pay-performance sensitivity to be related 
with information asymmetry. 
Table 13 also shows that the estimated coefficients of some control variables 
are statistically significant. The signs and significance levels of the control variables 
are consistent with those in the literature. For example, Firth et al. (2006) indicate the 
CEO’s pay-performance sensitivity is very low if the State Bureau has a controlling 
stake. Consistent with this analysis, I also find a significantly negative relation 
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between the top managers’ pay-performance sensitivity and the government control 
dummy variable (GOV). Consistent with the conclusion in Hartzell and Starks (2003) 
that institutional ownership is beneficial for managerial incentives, I find a 
significantly positive coefficient on institutional ownership.   
 [TABLE 13 HERE] 
Because the measure of pay-performance sensitivity is highly skewed, I also 
substitute the above panel data regression with median regression to test the 
robustness of the results following Kang and Liu (2008). Table 14 presents the 
median regression results based on eq. (4.2). As Table 13 shows that PIN is better at 
explaining the sample of positive PPS, I focus on these observations and estimate the 
regression equation defined by eq. (4.2). Columns (1), (2) and (3) show the 
regression results by using data from the whole market. In considering the variations 
across stock exchanges, I partition the sample into firms listed in SHSE and firms 
listed in SZSE and check the effect of information asymmetry on managerial 
incentives following the above econometric specification.  The regression results in 
columns (4) and (5) in Table 14 are for the data from the SHSE and the SZSE 
respectively. Moreover, I exclude the observations from B-shares and investigate the 
relation between PIN and CEO pay-performance sensitivity by including A-shares 
only from the whole sample. The regression results are shown in columns (6).  
In Table 14, PIN is highly significantly and positively related with PPS in all 
columns, at the 1% or 5% level. The coefficient estimates of variables as well as the 
explanatory power of the model remain similar across the different columns. 
Consistent with the panel data regression, the positive effect of PIN on PPS is shown 
to be weaker for the government-controlled firms than for the non-government-
controlled firms, as the coefficient estimates for the interaction terms, GOV×PIN, are 
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significantly negative at the 1% level in columns (2), (3), (4) and (6).  However, in 
column (5) with data from SZSE only, I find that the coefficient estimates of the 
government-control dummy variable, GOV and the interaction term, GOV×PIN are 
insignificant, indicating little state influence on managerial incentives in SZSE.  The 
result is expectable as most of the powerful SOEs prefer to be listed in SHSE, such 
as the big four state owned commercial banks, Ping’an insurnace, China Life 
insurance, Sinopec, China Unicom, etc. Comparably, SZSE has fewer influential 
SOEs and surfer less political interruption when it comes to corporate governance.   
In the panel data regression in Table 13, the estimates of pay-performance-sensitivity 
are highly skewed and drive the coefficients of several explanatory variables to be 
relatively high. Under median regression in Table 14, the magnitudes of the 
estimated coefficients are smaller. The results overall remain consistent for the fixed-
effect panel data regression in Table 13 and for the median regression in Table 14.  
[TABLE 14 HERE] 
 
4.5 Robustness Test: Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation 
In this section, I assume the effect of information asymmetry on managerial 
incentives to be endogenous. I apply an instrumental variable estimation technique to 
isolate the influence of PIN on pay-performance sensitivity. 
According to Thomas (2002), the accuracy of consensus forecasts (ERROR) 
and the dispersion (DISPERSION) among the forecasts of financial analysts can be 
considered as proxies for asymmetric information. Firms with larger information 
asymmetry between managers and outsiders regarding earnings are expected to have 
higher forecasting errors. The disagreement among financial analysts arises from a 
lack of available information about a firm.  
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Based on Gu and Wu (2003), analyst forecast error (ERROR) for firm i in year t 
is defined as the difference between the actual earnings per share (EPS) and the mean 
forecast deflated by the stock price at the beginning of the year, as follows: 
ܧܴܴܱܴ௜,௧ ൌ ௔௖௧௨௔௟	ா௉ௌ೔,೟	–௔௡௔௟௬௦௧	௙௢௥௘௖௔௦௧೔,೟௉௥௜௖௘೔,೟షభ ൈ 100              eq.(4.3)    
The analysts’ forecast dispersion is a measure of disagreement among analysts, 
which is defined as the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts deflated by the stock 
price five days before the earnings announcement date (Thomas, 2002), as follows: 
																																		ܦܫܵܲܧܴܵܫܱ ௜ܰ,௧ ൌ ௦௧ௗሺ௔௡௔௟௬௦௧	௙௢௥௘௖௔௦௧ሻ೔,೟௉௥௜௖௘೔,೟ ൈ 100                    eq.(4.4)  
For the IV approach, I include the above two measures, ERROR and 
DISPERSION, as my instrumental variables for the robust tests examining the 
endogeneity problem. In the first step, I estimate PIN against a set of firm-specific 
characteristics using the following model:     
ܲܫ ௜ܰ,௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܧܴܴܱܴ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଶܦܫܵܲܧܴܵܫܱ ௜ܰ,௧ ൅ ߙଷܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ ൅ ߙସܸܱܮܣܶܫܮܫܶ ௜ܻ,௧ ൅
																ߙହܳ௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଺ܴܱܣ௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଻ܵܶܣܶܧ௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଼ܫܰܵ ൅ ߙଽܵܪܴܼ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଵ଴ܣܩܧ௜,௧ ൅
																ߙଵଵܶܧܷܴܰܧ௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧																																																																																		݁ݍ. ሺ4.5ሻ                             
In the second step, I use the fitted value estimate	ܲܫ෢ܰ ௜,௧ from regression (4.5) as 
an instrument for the original PIN estimate and include it along with a number of 
exogenous variables in the following regression: 
         ܲܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܲܫ෢ܰ ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܸܱܮܣܶܫܮܶ ௜ܻ,௧ିଵ ൅	ߚସܳ௜,௧ିଵ ൅
																									ߚହܴܱܣ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଺ܵܶܣܶܧ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଻ܫܰ ௜ܵ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଼ܵܪܴܼ௜,௧ିଵ ൅
																									ߚଽܣܩܧ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܶܧܷܴܰܧ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ∑ ߮௞௞ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ	ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ ൅
																										∑ ߶௧௧ ܻ݁ܽݎ	ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ ൅ ߝ௜,௧																																																												eq.(4.6) 																														
        To test the robustness of my results, I use the two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
procedure with the hypothesis of: 
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H0: 1 =0. 
H1: 1 >0. 
Columns (1)-(3) in Table 15 report the regression results of the effect of 
information asymmetry on managerial incentives using ERROR only as the 
instrumental variable while columns (4)-(6) report the results using both ERROR and 
DISPERSION as instrumental variables. As shown in the table, the coefficient 
estimates for the fitted value of PIN, PINన,୲෣ , are all significantly positive under the 
different regression methods (i.e., IV regression or panel data regression with fixed-
effects) or model specification in explaining PPS, providing a strong evidence that 
information asymmetry is associated with higher managerial incentives. Furthermore, 
consistent with Thomas (2002), the coefficient estimates of ERROR and 
DISPERSION are significantly positive at the 5% level in column (4), indicating that 
firm with higher information asymmetry have higher analysts’ forecast errors and 
variation. In addition, the coefficient estimates of other explanatory variables 
indicate that smaller firms and lower stock price volatility are consistent with higher 
managerial incentives, which are conformable with the expectation in the literature 
(e.g. Schaefer, 1998; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). However, the effects of government 
ownership on CEO pay-performance sensitivity are no longer significant here.  
[TABLE 15 HERE] 
 
4.6 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I investigate the role of the probability of information-based 
stock trading in affecting managerial incentives in China. Using executive 
compensation data and stock market data, I empirically test the economic 
significance of how information asymmetry has an effect on optimal contracting. I 
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use the probability of informed trading (PIN) as a proxy of stock price 
informativeness and find a significantly positive relationship between the level of 
information asymmetry (PIN) and the CEO’s pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) for 
Chinese firms.  
When more information asymmetry is revealed from the stock market, market 
monitoring is enhanced to drive the CEO to work in the interests of the shareholders. 
Consequently, a CEO’s pay becomes more sensitive to the wealth of the principals 
due to extra monitoring and more efficient compensation structure. My study not 
only highlights the important role of the information based-trading in strengthening 
executive compensation but also generates useful managerial implications. In 
particular, the principals should make an effort to promote information-based trading 
and incorporate trading characteristics (e.g., stock price informativeness, liquidity) 
into the contracting process. Apart from the function of market monitoring, 
institutional ownership could also work as an alternative monitoring mechanism in 
optimal contracting, which deserves the attentions of principals to incentivize 
executives.   
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Chapter 5. Conclusion  
 
My study estimates the probability of informed trading (PIN) measure in 
China and uses it as a proxy of information asymmetry to analyze its economic role 
on firm diversification discount and managerial incentives.  
There are several findings about the PIN in China’s financial markets. First of 
all, compared with the U.S. data, the PIN estimate is higher in China, indicating a 
more serious information asymmetry problem in this financial market. Secondly, the 
information asymmetry levels in the two separated stock exchanges are significantly 
different. The average PIN in the SZSE is higher than the one in the SHSE, 
indicating the more severe information problems in the SZSE. Thirdly, the PIN 
estimate is higher for the B-shares than for A-shares in some years, which indicates 
that there is more uninformed trading in the A-shares market.  
I perform two independent research studies using the PIN estimates in China. 
Firstly, the role of information asymmetry on corporate diversification is examined. 
Although most empirical studies conclude that diversification is a value-destroying 
activity, there is less empirical evidence discussing why this discount exists. The 
quantitative results in this study suggest that diversified firms have more severe 
information problems and that increased information asymmetry is responsible for 
the loss of the firm value. The strategy of corporate diversification itself is not value-
destroying. The loss of value is caused by the lack of transparency.  
Secondly, I examine the relation between executive incentives and stock price 
informativeness. The empirical findings imply that information asymmetry helps 
strengthen managerial incentives as a significantly positive relation between PIN and 
executive pay-performance sensitivity is found. After using analyst forecast error and 
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dispersion as instrumental variables to control for the endogeneity problem, the 
results remain unchanged. These conclusions suggest that the information 
incorporated into stock prices helps connect executive compensation to firm 
performance and mitigate the principal-agency problem to some extent. 
With the estimate of PIN and its corresponding parameters, there are several 
issues could be investigated in the future. While previous research tests the risk of 
information asymmetry in the U.S. and other countries (Easley et al., 2005; Lu and 
Wong, 2008), the intricate explanatory power of PIN on the asset returns in China is 
left unexplored. Copeland et al. (2009) have tested only the information risk in the 
SHSE. Since the information environment is important for the investment visibility 
and profit of outsider investors, I could also examine the effect of information 
asymmetry on earnings surprise. Finally, it is worthwhile to investigate the impacts 
of state and foreign ownership on information asymmetry using the evidence from 
emerging markets, such as China.   
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Table 1 Yearly  market overview in China's stock market 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Panel A: Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) 
No. of Trading Days 237 241 243 242 241 242 246 
No. of Listed Companies 715 780 837 833 842 860 864 
Market Capitalization (100 Million RMB Yuan) 25363.72 29804.92 26014.34 23096.13 71612.38 269838.87 97251.91 
A-shares 24921.42 29400.65 25714.07 22856.07 71117.95 268497.27 96875.31 
B-shares 442.3 404.27 300.27 240.06 494.43 1314.6 376.59 
Composite Index 1357.65 1497.04 1266.5 1161.06 2675.47 5261.56 1820.81 
Panel B: Shenzhen Stock Exchange                
No. of Trading Days 237 241 243 242 241 242 246 
No. of Listed Companies 508 505 536 544 579 670 740 
Market Capitalization (100 Million RMB Yuan) 12965.41 12652.79 11041.23 9334.15 17791.52 57302.02 24114.53 
A-shares 12605.14 12119.83 10181.84 8472.93 14980.71 45443.63 17421.56 
B-shares 360.27 532.96 445.95 379.67 795.51 1211.55 423.29 
Composite Index 512.38 449.42 470.55 333.28 550.59 1551.19 1576.5 
                       
Source: complied from the webpage of Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchang 
Weblink: http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/en/home/home  &  http://www.szse.cn/main/en
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Table 2 Summary statistics for PIN measure 
 
Variables mean s.d. median 25% 75% Nobs 
Panel A: Summary Statistics of PIN 
2002 0.215 0.068 0.214 0.177 0.251 1,247 
2003 0.316 0.093 0.319 0.261 0.375 1,296 
2004 0.234 0.067 0.248 0.192 0.283 1,444 
2005 0.243 0.046 0.247 0.22 0.272 1,429 
2006 0.227 0.05 0.231 0.201 0.261 1,489 
2007 0.18 0.05 0.179 0.148 0.211 1,584 
2008 0.176 0.057 0.170 0.136 0.218 1,663 
SHSE 0.223 0.081 0.219 0.169 0.266 5,869 
SZSE 0.227 0.068 0.230 0.181 0.270 4,283 
Total 0.225 0.076 0.224 0.174 0.268 10,152 
Panel B:  Summary Statistics of PIN parameters  
α 0.287 0.137 0.266 0.182 0.372 10,152 
δ 0.362 0.348 0.227 0.06 0.661 10,152 
μ 130.611 88.341 109.726 62.653 187.891 10,152 
εb 93.806 129.28 39.034 14.872 118.114 10,152 
εs   99.482 129.612 46.375 17.489 127.598 10,152 
 
The table shows the summary statistics of the annual PIN estimates and the parameters for 1,869 firms 
listed in SHSE and SZSE during the period from 2002 to 2008 with 10,152 firm-year observations. 
Panel A presents the summary statistics of PIN estimates by year and then by stock exchanges; Panel 
B shows the parameters that are used to calculate PIN.  
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Table 3 Comparison of PIN: B-shares versus the corresponding A-shares 
 
Panel A: SHSE 
  A-share B-share Diff PIN 
Year # of firms mean s.d. Mean s.d. mean s.d. t-stat 
         
2002 19 0.2037 0.0353 0.2134 0.2199 -0.0097 0.2188 -0.1940 
2003 22 0.3296 0.1027 0.3456 0.0708 -0.0160 0.0035 -21.1670 
2004 34 0.2408 0.0688 0.2231 0.0518 0.0178 0.0896 1.1577 
2005 27 0.2699 0.0472 0.2174 0.0625 0.0524 0.0728 3.7406 
2006 44 0.2471 0.0499 0.2543 0.0518 -0.0072 0.0755 -0.6293 
2007 44 0.1918 0.0464 0.2134 0.0888 -0.0197 0.0867 -1.4940 
2008 44 0.1999 0.0512 0.2267 0.0464 -0.0490 0.0694 -4.6871 
Total 44 0.2296 0.0731 0.2379 0.0936 -0.0083 0.1067 -1.1887 
Panel A: SZSE 
  A-share B-share Diff PIN 
Year # of firms mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. t-stat 
2002 35 0.2283 0.0502 0.2283 0.0496 0.0000 0.0725 0.0023 
2003 34 0.3039 0.0401 0.3177 0.0696 -0.0138 0.0975 -0.8268 
2004 37 0.2670 0.0352 0.2400 0.0354 0.0270 0.0569 2.8842 
2005 30 0.2550 0.0441 0.2221 0.0537 0.0329 0.0833 2.1635 
2006 39 0.2221 0.0546 0.2546 0.0365 -0.0325 0.0692 -2.9379 
2007 40 0.1724 0.0468 0.2149 0.0700 -0.0425 0.0805 -3.3407 
2008 34 0.1614 0.0479 0.2265 0.0547 -0.0651 0.0644 -5.8949 
Total 42 0.2285 0.0688 0.2432 0.0625 -0.0147 0.0816 -2.8465 
 
The table shows the mean and standard deviation (s.d.) of the annual PIN estimates for the firms 
traded as both A-shares and B-shares during the period from 2002 to 2008. Panel A shows the 
statistics for SHZE and Panel B for SZSE. The annual difference between the PIN of A-shares and 
that of its corresponding B-shares is summarized under the columns of “Diff PIN” (Diff PIN = PINA – 
PINB). 
77 
 
                   Table 4 Summary statistics: diversification measures, firm and CEO specific characteristics 
Variables Definition mean s.d. median 25% 75% 
DIV Dummy variables for diversification 0.55 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 
HI Herfindahl Index for diversification 0.73 0.24 0.77 0.51 0.97 
Q Tobin's Q 1.35 0.51 1.15 1.00 1.49 
ROA Return on assets 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.08 
SIZE The logarithm of total assets 21.45 1.08 21.36 20.75 22.06 
VOLATILITY Annualized volatility of daily stock return 0.48 0.17 0.45 0.36 0.61 
TAGrow The percentage annual change in total assets 0.15 0.50 0.08 -0.01 0.21 
INTANG The ratio of intangible assets to total assets 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.05 
LEVERAGE The ratio of book value of debt to total assets 0.51 0.17 0.52 0.38 0.64 
STATE The percentage of shares held by State Agencies 30.54 24.37 31.73 2.00 51.46 
GOV A dummy variable that takes 1 if it is a state owned firm 0.70 0.46 1.00 0.00 1.00 
INS The percentage of shares held by Institutions 14.28 17.29 6.48 0.87 21.66 
SHRCR The percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder 38.62 16.31 36.27 25.7 51.11 
AGE The number of years after going public 8.03 3.50 8.00 6.00 11.00 
EXCHANGE A dummy variable that takes 1 if firm listed in SHSE  0.54 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 
 
                      The table presents the summary statistics of the annual estimates of diversification, firm values, and other firm-level and industry-level  
                      control variables over the period from January 2003 and December 2008.
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Table 5 Correlation matrix 
  PIN DIV HI Q ROA SIZE VOLATILITY TAGrow ITANG 
LEVER
AGE STATE GOV INS SHRCR 
DIV 0.02* 
HI 0.01 -0.68*** 
Q -0.01  -0.01  0.00  
ROA 0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.61*** 
SIZE -0.17*** -0.03*** 0.07*** -0.13***  -0.10***  
VOLATILITY -0.26*** -0.04*** 0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.08*** 
TAGrow -0.05*** -0.07*** 0.02  -0.01  -0.02**  0.13*** 0.20*** 
INTANG -0.03*** 0.05*** -0.06*** -0.01  -0.01  -0.15*** 0.02*** -0.08*** 
LEVERAGE 0.00  -0.02  -0.01  0.30***  0.08***  -0.15*** -0.01  -0.03*** -0.01  
STATE 0.08*** -0.06*** 0.08*** -0.02*  -0.01  0.24*** -0.09*** 0.00  -0.07*** -0.02  
GOV -0.01  -0.07*** 0.03** 0.00  -0.01  0.22*** -0.06*** 0.04*** -0.07*** 0.00  0.67*** 
INS -0.17*** -0.11*** 0.04*** -0.01  -0.01  0.36*** 0.08*** 0.13*** -0.03*** -0.03** -0.04*** 0.04*** 
SHRCR 0.08*** -0.12*** 0.14*** -0.02*  -0.01  0.25*** -0.01  0.07*** -0.09*** -0.02** 0.55*** 0.33*** 0.05*** 
AGE -0.18*** 0.11*** -0.08*** 0.01  0.00  0.05*** 0.13*** -0.06*** 0.09*** 0.05*** -0.15*** -0.05*** 0.00  -0.20*** 
 
This table presents the correlations among all candidate variables for diversification and firm value. These variables include the measure of information asymmetry (PIN), Tobin’s Q 
(Q), return on assets (ROA), firm size (SIZE), stock return volatility (VOLATILITY), the change in total assets (TAGrow), the percentage of intangible assets (INTANG), leverage, 
state ownership (STATE), government-controlled dummy variable (GOV), institutional ownership (INS), ownership concentration (SHRCR) and the number of years of firms after 
went public (AGE). All the variables are annual measures during the period from January 2003 to December 2008. And the *, ** and ** stand for the significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 6 Comparison of diversified and non-diversified firms 
Variable 
Diversified firms Non-diversified firms 
mean difference mean s.d. mean s.d. 
PIN 0.23 0.08 0.22 0.07 0.01**[ 1.81] 
Q 1.34 0.51 1.36 0.50 -0.02*[1.38] 
ROA 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 -0.01***[-5.24] 
SIZE 21.38 1.02 21.54 1.15 -0.16***[-5.50] 
VOLATILITY 0.50 0.44 0.54 0.46 -0.04***[-4.00] 
TAGrow 0.14 0.50 0.17 0.49 -0.03**[-2.22] 
INTANG 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.01***[4.41] 
LEVERAGE 0.55 0.59 0.54 0.53 0.02[1.02] 
STATE 0.28 0.24 0.34 0.25 -0.06***[- 8.42] 
GOV 0.66 0.47 0.73 0.44 -0.07***[-5.61] 
INS 13.18 17.07 16.73 20.35 -3.55***[-6.95] 
SHRCR 36.53 15.98 41.21 16.33 -4.68***[-10.57] 
AGE 8.28 3.52 7.72 3.44 0.56***[5.89] 
Nobs 2979 2398 
 
***, ** and * denote respectively, significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% for a two-tailed 
two sample t-test.  And the numbers in the brackets are the t-statistics.  
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Table 7 Comparison of government-controlled versus non-government-
controlled and diversified versus non-diversified firms 
 Diversified firms Non-diversified firms Row Test 
PIN 
Government-Controlled 0.22(0.07) 0.22(0. 07) 0.00[0.60] 
Non-government 0.22(0.07) 0.23(0.07) -0.00[-0.63] 
Col Test 0.00[0.05] -0.00[-1.08]  
Q 
Government-Controlled 1.28(0.47) 1.27(0.45) 0.01[0.70] 
Non-government 1.42(0.57) 1.47(0.60) -0.05**[- 1.65] 
 Col Test -0.14***[- 6.71] -0.20***[-8.37]  
ROA 
Government-Controlled 0.04(0.09) 0.05(0.13) -0.01***[-3.49] 
Non-government 0.00(0. 68) 0.03(0.23) -0.03[-1.04] 
Col Test -0.04[-1.64] 0.02***[3.34]  
SIZE 
Government-Controlled 21.54(1.03) 21.73(1.14) -0.20***[-5.62] 
Non-government 21.07(0.92) 21.01(1.00) 0.06*[1.30] 
Col Test 0.47***[12.03] 0.73***[14.28]  
VOLATILITY 
Government-Controlled 0.48(0.18) 0.47(0.16) 0.02***[3.17] 
Non-government 0.50(0.19) 0.51(0.17) -0.01[-1.03] 
Col Test -0.01*[-1.93] -0.04***[-5.46]  
TAGrow 
Government-Controlled 0.15(0.57) 0.17(0.39) -0.02[-1.22] 
Non-government 0.11(0.32) 0.15(0.69) -0.05**[-1.86] 
Col Test 0.05***[2.39] 0.02[0.87]  
INTANG 
Government-Controlled 0.05(0.07) 0.04(0.06) 0.01***[4.86] 
Non-government 0.05(0.06) 0.05(0.07) 0.00[0.19] 
Col Test 0.00[0.01] -0.01***[-3.28]  
LEVERAGE 
Government-Controlled 0.52(0.23) 0.51(0.31) 0.00[0.35] 
Non-government 0.63(0.96) 0.61(0.89) 0.02[0.45] 
Col Test -0.11***[-4.86] -0.11***[-4.86]  
STATE 
Government-Controlled 0.39(0.20) 0.44(0.44) -0.04***[-6.59] 
Non-government 0.06(0.12) 0.06(0.12) -0.00[-0.24] 
Col Test 0.34***[49.61] 0.38***[45.64]  
INS 
Government-Controlled 13.63(17.36) 17.56(20.74) -3.94***[-6.31] 
Non-government 12.31(16.45) 14.43(19.08) -2.13***[-2.40] 
Col Test 1.32**[2.00] 3.13***[3.33]  
SHRCR 
Government-Controlled 39.94(16.31) 44.45(15.88) -4.51***[-8.54] 
Non-government 29.83(12.93) 32.30(14.11) -2.47***[-3.64] 
Col Test 10.11***[17.10] 12.15***[17.04]  
AGE 
Government-Controlled 8.25(3.54) 7.60(3.40) 0.65***[5.67] 
Non-government 8.35(3.49) 8.04(3.52) 0.31**[1.73] 
Col Test -0.10[-0.72] -0.44***[-2.75]  
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Figures in cells are the sample means and figures in the cells with parentheses are standard deviations. 
The null hypotheses that the differences in sample means across ownership type and across 
diversification type are zero are tested using a two-tailed two sample t-test. The differences in sample 
means across diversification type are reported in the row test, differences in sample means across 
ownership type are reported in the column test and the figures in brackets are t-statistics. *** , ** and 
* denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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Table 8 Panel data regression of the effect of PIN and diversification on firm value 
   Q Qt+1 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DIV  
-0.02*** -0.01 0.04      -0.05***  -0.03  
[-2.60] [-1.13] [1.24]      [-3.45]  [-0.73]  
HI 
      0.04** 0.02 -0.09  
      [2.13] [0.91] [-1.46]  
PIN 
  -0.53*** -0.22**    -0.52*** -0.80***  -0.53***  
  [-6.54] [-2.04 ]   [-6.55] [-3.88]  [-3.50]  
DIV*PIN 
    -0.27**  -0.00  
    [-2.17]  [-0.01]  
HI*PIN 
    0.59**  
    [2.25]  
SIZE 
-0.17*** -0.19*** -0.17***  -0.17*** -0.19*** -0.17***  -0.23***  -0.26***  
[-33.33] [-38.82] [-33.44]  [-33.32] [-38.83] [-33.46]  [-32.84]  [-36.46]  
VOLATILITY 
0.06 0.07* 0.03  0.06 0.07* 0.03  -0.04  -0.02  
[1.32] [1.69] [0.77]  [1.28] [1.67] [0.76]  [-0.61]  [-0.31]  
TAGrow 
-0.04*** -0.05*** -0.04***  -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.04***  -0.07***  -0.08***  
[-4.42] [-5.52] [-4.13]  [-4.40] [-5.52] [-4.10]  [-4.94]  [-5.81]  
INTANG 
-0.07 -0.05 -0.07  -0.06 -0.05 -0.07  -0.07  -0.05  
[-0.89] [-0.7] p-0.93]  [-0.85] [-0.68] [-0.89]  [-0.64]  [-0.46]  
LEVERAGE 
0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***  0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***  0.03***  0.03***  
[6.35] [6.44] [6.36]  [6.36] [6.45] [6.38]  [2.76]  [2.69]  
STATE 
0.03 -0.06** 0.03  0.03 -0.06* 0.03  0.08  0.11***  
[0.97] [-1.97] [0.87]  [0.94] [-1.96] [0.82]  [1.80]  [2.62]  
GOV 
-0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07***  -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07***  -0.12***  -0.13***  
[-4.82] [-5.28] [-4.82]  [-4.75] [-5.25] [-4.47]  [-6.17]  [-6.54]  
INS 
0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02***  0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02***  0.03***  0.01***  
[23.66] [34.22] [23.90]  [23.69] [34.27] [8.27]  [17.75]  [25.90]  
SHRCR 
-0.00 -0.01** -0.00  -0.00* -0.00** -0.00  -0.00***  -0.00***  
[-1.81] [-2.36] [-1.64]  [-1.79] [-2.35] [-1.57]  [-2.74]  [-3.21]  
AGE 
0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***  0.01*** 0.01** 0.01***  0.02***  0.02***  
[8.43] [9.82] [8.26]  [8.43] [9.82] [8.27]  [7.71]  [8.71]  
CONSTANT 
4.60*** 5.37*** 4.80***  4.56*** 5.35*** 4.88***  6.04***  6.87***  
[41.86] [45.53] [39.00]  [41.46] [45.28] [38.25]  [38.92]  [39.98]  
INDUSTRY Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YEAR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.565 0.6063 0.5668 0.5648 0.6063 0.5667 0.5503 0.5571 
Obs 5377 5377 5377 5377 5377 5377 5377 5377 
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This table contains cross-sectional regression results following eq. (3.5.1) and eq. (3.5.2) with 5377 
firm-year observations. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q (Q) in columns (1) to columns (6) and 
one-year lagged Tobin’s Q (Lag (Q)) in columns (7) to column (8). DIV is the dummy variable for 
diversification, HI is the sales-based Herfindahl index and PIN is the estimate of information 
asymmetry. The interaction terms, DIVൈPIN (HIൈPIN), measure the effects of the interplay between 
diversification and information asymmetry on the firm value. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets, 
VOLATILITY is the annualized volatility of daily stock returns, TAGrow is the percentage change in 
total assets, INTANG is the percentage of intangible assets, LEVERAGE is the ratio of book value of 
debt to total assets, STATE is the percentage of shares held by the state agency, GOV is the dummy 
variable that takes 1 if state owned firms, SHRCR is the ownership concentration measure, INS is the 
percentage of shares held by institutions, AGE is the number of years after going public. Figures in 
brackets are t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
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Table 9 Regression of the effect of PIN on diversification discount: subsamples 
Independent   
Variables 
SHSE SZSE A-shares Govnment-Cotrolled Non-Govnment-Cotrolled 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 DIV -0.02* -0.00 -0.04*** -0.02 -0.03*** -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03* -0.03 [-1.82] [-0.11] [-2.61] [-1.37] [-2.70] [-1.15] [-1.60] [-1.48] [-1.73] [-1.00] 
PIN -0.45*** -0.63*** -0.52*** -0.46*** -0.49** [-4.47] [-4.62] [-6.34] [-4.86] [-2.48] 
SIZE -0.13*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.22*** -0.17*** -0.20*** -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.22*** -0.23*** [-19.52] [-28.24] [-21.72] [-25.92] [-33.94] [-39.11] [-25.43] [-25.93] [-19.99] [-16.16] 
VOLATILITY 0.04 0.12** -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.12* 0.51*** [0.68] [2.39] [-0.10] [-0.27] [1.56] [1.46] [1.31] [0.76] [1.68] [6.46] 
TAGrow -0.03** -0.05*** -0.05** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.04** 0.04 [-2.42] [-4.54] [-2.53] [-2.78] [-3.54] [-4.52] [-3.26] [-3.01] [-2.07] [1.45] 
INTANG -0.31*** -0.23** 0.06 0.00 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.03 0.04 [-2.75] [-2.00] [0.50] [0.28] [-1.03] [-0.96] [-0.73] [-0.80] [-0.18] [0.21] 
LEVERAGE 0.05*** 0.05 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.01*** 0.05*** -0.04** -0.04** 0.06*** 0.05*** [4.80] [0.01] [3.50] [3.67] [6.70] [6.75] [-2.12] [-1.97] [5.43] [3.55] 
STATE -0.05 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.09 -0.26** [-1.00] [0.87] [0.46] [1.47] [1.02] [1.71] [-0.99] [-1.05] [-1.17] [-2.43] 
GOV -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.01*** -0.07*** -0.06*** [-2.65] [-3.32] [-2.95] [-3.58] [-4.60] [-4.70] 
INS 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.00*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** [18.00] [26.18] [15.20] [21.91] [24.54] [33.28] [19.65] [19.92] [12.51] [14.12] 
SHRCR -0.00 -0.01* -0.00 -0.00* -0.00* -0.00** 0.00 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** [-0.68] [-1.80] [-0.98] [-1.65] [-1.68] [-2.17] [0.41] [0.56] [-3.84] [-4.11] 
AGE 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** [3.97] [6.79] [6.12] [5.76] [8.45] [9.65] [6.78] [6.70] [4.05] [4.69] 
CONSTANT 3.95*** 5.11*** 4.80*** 5.82*** 4.70*** 5.45*** 4.06*** 4.35*** 5.71*** 5.91*** [27.51] [34.16] [25.67] [28.83] [42.95] [46.41] [32.73] [31.69] [23.90] [17.80] 
INDUSTRY Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YEAR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.5196 0.6064 0.5710 0.6116 0.5689 0.6079 0.5342 0.537 0.6116 0.6177 
Obs 3139 3139 2238 2238 5126 5126 3736 3736 1641 1641 
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This table contains cross-sectional regression results following eq. (3.5.1) and eq. (3.5.2). The 
dependent variable is Tobin’s Q (Q). DIV is the dummy variable for diversification and PIN is the 
estimate of information asymmetry. Columns (1) and (2) include the firms listed on the SHSE only 
while columns (3) and (4) include the firms listed on the SZSE only. Columns (5) and (6) include only 
A-shares. Columns (7) and (8) include government-controlled listed firms only while columns (9) and 
(10) include non-government controlled listed firms only. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets, 
VOLATILITY is the annualized volatility of daily stock returns, TAGrow is the percentage change in 
total assets, INTANG is the percentage of intangible assets, LEVERAGE is the ratio of book value of 
debt to total assets, STATE is the percentage of shares held by the state agency, GOV is the dummy 
variable that takes 1 if the firm is a  state owned firm, SHRCR is the ownership concentration measure, 
INS is the percentage of shares held by institutions, AGE is the number of years after going public. 
Figures in brackets are t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively.  
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Table 10 Robustness test of the effect of PIN on diversification discount 
 
Independent 
Variables  
DIV HI 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
First-stage Second-stage Residual First-stage 
Second-
stage Residual 
PDIV -2.60*** 
[-8.39] 
PHI 6.35*** 
[9.58] 
Residual -0.00 0.01 
[-0.85] [0.49] 
PIN 0.94** -0.10** 
[2.02] [-2.00] 
SIZE -0.06* -0.17*** -0.19*** 0.00 -0.20*** -0.19*** 
[-1.89] [-24.42] [-30.24] [0.39] [-31.23] [-30.41] 
VOLATILITY 0.10 0.33*** 0.33*** -0.00 0.25*** 0.33*** 
[0.64] [12.37] [12.38] [-0.05] [9.03] [12.39] 
TAGrow -0.02 0.03* 0.03* 0.00 0.02 0.03* 
[-0.23] [1.68] [1.94] [0.27] [1.38] [1.95] 
INTANG 1.03** 0.46*** -0.07 -0.18*** 1.07*** -0.07 
[2.08] [4.01] [-0.78] [-3.60] [7.06] [-0.78] 
LEVERAGE -0.03 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.00 0.04*** 0.04*** 
[-0.51] [2.88] [4.28] [0.00] [4.33] [4.28] 
STATE -0.15 -0.12*** -0.03 0.01 -0.07** -0.03 
[-0.99] [-3.80] [-1.12] [0.53] [-2.47] [-1.13] 
INS -0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01** 0.77** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
[-6.84] [4.92] [33.82] [2.45] [23.88] [33.75] 
SHRCR -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00*** 0.00*** -0.01*** -0.00*** 
[-5.09] [-9.44] [-4.23] [5.39] [-10.50] [-4.32] 
AGE 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.02*** -0.01*** 0.07*** 0.02*** 
[7.16] [11.73] [10.43] [-8.46] [12.47] [10.43] 
EXCHANGE 0.52*** 0.30*** -0.00 -0.05*** 0.31*** -0.00 
[8.79] [7.96] [-0.06] [-7.74] [8.98] [-0.06] 
CONSTANT -0.18 6.56*** 5.04*** -4.89** 0.36*** 5.04*** 
[-0.25] [29.04] [37.17] [-2.17] [3.34] [37.15] 
INDUSTRY Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YEAR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.1028 0.3262 0.3176 0.1032 0.3288 0.3175 
Obs 5377 5377 5377 5377 5377 5377 
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Column (1) ((4)) presents first-stage logit regression estimates with DIV (HI) as the dependent 
variable. Column (2) ((5)) presents the second stage regression estimates with the Tobin’s Q (Q) as 
dependent variables, and the predicted DIV (HI) as the major independent variable. Column (3) ((6)) 
is the regression estimations with Tobin’s Q (Q) as the dependent variables, and the predicted 
residuals in first-stage regression as the main independent variable. The sample consists of listed firm 
in China stock markets from 2003 to 2008 with 5377 firm-year observations. Regressions include 
industry dummies and year dummies. Figures in brackets are t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote 
significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 11 Summary statistics: executive incentives measure and firm / CEO characteristics 
Variables Definition mean s.d. median 25% 75% 
PPS Pay-performance sensitivity 1.69 0.45 1.72 1.24 2.14 
OWN_PPS Change in CEO's wealth based on the stock ownership only per RMB1000 change in the shareholder's wealth 0.47 2.17 0.00 0.00 0.03 
CASH_PPS Change in CEO's wealth based on the basic salary and bonus only  per RMB1000 change in the shareholder's wealth 1.22 0.47 1.23 0.75 1.70 
SIZE The logarithm of  market value 14.54 1.09 14.38 13.82 15.05 
VOLATILITY Annualized volatility of daily stock returns 0.51 0.16 0.44 0.35 0.60 
Q Tobin's Q 1.34 0.48 1.17 1.02 1.48 
ROA Return on assets 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.08 
STATE The percentage of shares held by State Agencies 30.46 25.16 31.57 0.00 52.51 
GOV Dummy variable that coded 1 if it is a state owned firm 0.71 0.46 1.00 0.00 1.00 
INS The percentage of shares held by Institutions 15.53 19.21 7.17 1.05 23.30 
SHRZ Ownership concentration 19.17 31.25 4.85 1.79 19.32 
AGE The age of CEO 45.78 6.70 45.00 41.00 50.00 
TENURE The numbers of years as CEO 2.83 0.72 3.00 3.00 3.00 
 
The table shows the definition and the summary statistics of the annual estimates of various variables. The sample period is from  
January 2004 to December 2009 for the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) and is from January 2003 to December 2008 for the  
other variables. 
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Table 12 Comparison of government-controlled versus non-government-
controlled firms 
 
Variable 
Government-controlled Non-government-controlled  
Mean difference 
Mean s.d. Mean s.d.  
PIN 0.23 0.08 0.23 0.07  -0.00[-0.76] 
PPS 1.68 0.45 1.69 0.45  -0.01*[-1.39] 
SIZE 14.67 1.05 14.26 0.90  0.41***[16.90] 
VOLATILITY 0.45 0.16 0.48 0.28  -0.03***[-5.86] 
Q 1.28 0.43 1.44 0.55  -0.16***[-13.82]
ROA 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.07  0.01***[5.83] 
STATE 0.42 0.21 0.06 0.12  0.36***[80.26] 
INS 15.52 19.52 13.64 17.82  1.88***[3.67] 
SHRZ 39.62 190.63 11.31 32.98  28.31***[6.92] 
AGE 46.44 6.43 44.09 6.94  2.34***[14.50] 
TENURE 2.83 0.69 2.78 0.71  0.05***[3.04] 
Nobs 4340 1773  
 
The table shows the mean and standard deviation (s.d.) of the variables when firms are separated into 
two groups, government-controlled firms and non-government-controlled firms. The variables are 
defined in Table 11. ***, ** and * denote respectively, significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% for a 
two-tailed two sample t-test.  And the numbers in the brackets are the t-statistics. 
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Table 13 Panel data regression of CEO pay-performance sensitivity (PPS)  
 
Independent 
Variables 
PPS OWN_PPS CASH_PPS PPS+ 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PIN 
1388.79*** 1409.84*** -22.24 1278.56** 2301.33*** 2337.91*** 
[3.07] [2.99] [-0.30] [2.30] [3.83] [3.69] 
SIZE 
-7.55 7.69 11.75 -79.76 
[-0.13] [0.79] [0.16] [-0.98] 
VOLATILITY 
-72.23 -15.03 -36.02 53.35 
[-0.37] [-0.72] [-0.23] [0.2] 
Q 
2.10 0.14 3.06 -60.796** 
[0.27] [0.11] [0.32] [-2.48] 
ROA 
-24.41 -0.56 -30.23 -21.10 
[-0.44] [-0.06] [-0.44] [-0.36] 
STATE 
-87.78 -97.19 -17.81 -1.44 -43.02 -39.25 
[-0.67] [-0.71] [-0.79] [-0.80] [-0.25] [-0.21] 
GOV 
-259.72* -266.64* -11.69 112.15 -607.08*** -619.06*** 
[-1.70] [-1.67] [-0.50] [0.64] [-2.96] [-2.82] 
GOV_PIN 
-1451.69*** -1505.03*** 64.91 -920.90 -2508.55*** -2579.01 
[-2.96] [-2.94] [0.79] [-1.50] [-3.76] [-3.66] 
INS 
-2.80** -2.81* -0.22 -1.44 -2.96* -2.12 
[-2.01] [-1.88] [-0.91] [-0.80] [-1.71] [-1.13] 
SHRZ 
0.01 -0.89 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
[0.14] [-0.21] [0.03] [0.03] -0.08 [-0.06] 
AGE 
-8.47 0.58 -1.53 5.06 
[-0.32] [0.83] [-0.30] [0.85] 
TENURE 
-9.84 -0.53 -9.54 -39.41 
[-0.30] [-0.12] [-0.30] [-1.1] 
CONSTANT 
-210.46 48.11 -173.06 -286.80 852.37 2484.39 
[-0.21] [0.03] [-0.64] [-0.14] [0.87] [1.23] 
INDUSTRY Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YEAR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.0220 0.0225 0.0018 0.0138 0.1077 0.1117 
Obs 6113 6113 6113 6113 3605 3605 
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This table contains fixed-effect estimates of the panel regression of PIN on PPS. The dependent 
variable is the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS), defined as eq. (4.1). PPS+ is a subsample of the 
original PPS which includes positive observations only. OWN_PPS is the managerial stock ownership 
component of the original PPS while CASH_PPS is the basic salary and bonus component of the 
original PPS. PIN is the estimate of information asymmetry defined in section (4.3.2). SIZE is the 
logarithm of total market value of equity, VOLATILITY is the annualized volatility of daily stock 
returns, Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of equity plus book value of total debts divided by 
the book value of assets, STATE is the percentage of shares held by the state agency, GOV is the 
dummy variable that takes 1 if state owned firms, INS is the percentage of shares held by institutions, 
SHRZ is the ownership of the largest shareholder over that of the second largest shareholder,  AGE is 
the  age of CEO and TENURE is the number of years as CEO worked in the firm. Figures in brackets 
are t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
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Table 14 Median regression of CEO pay-performance sensitivity  
Independent 
Variables 
whole market SHSE SZSE A-shares 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PIN 32.61*** 78.81*** 79.60*** 79.88*** 79.31** 58.97*** 
[2.59] [3.76] [4.22] [4.16] [2.30] [2.95] 
SIZE -5.69*** -4.14*** -4.43*** -4.82*** -6.41*** -4.31*** 
[-8.33] [-5.01] [-5.73] [-5.87] [-3.60] [-5.22] 
VOLATILITY -5.55 -4.06 -5.42 5.72 -8.87* 4.69 
[-0.81] [-0.61] [-0.81] [0.93] [-1.69] [0.73] 
Q -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.08 -0.81 0.02 
[-1.02] [0.10] [-0.01] [-0.44] [-0.90] [0.13] 
ROA -0.01 -0.11 -0.09 -0.27 5.97 -0.11 
[-0.29] [-0.13] [-0.11] [-0.61] [0.79] [-0.12] 
STATE   -10.29** -11.27*** -0.03 -18.32** -9.91** 
  [-2.39] [-2.86] [-0.63] [-2.16] [-2.32] 
GOV   -17.01*** -18.30*** -17.57*** -1.09 -14.97*** 
  [-3.04] [-3.61] [-3.36] [-0.10] [-2.76] 
GOV_PIN   -70.25*** -71.36*** -90.15*** 37.89 -59.69*** 
  [-3.03] [-3.40] [-4.14] [0.81] [-2.64] 
INS   -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 
  [-1.09] [-1.13] [-0.63] [-0.46] [-0.84] 
SHRZ   0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  [0.54] [0.64] [1.20] [0.13] [0.16] 
AGE     -0.07 -0.09 -0.15 -0.07 
    [-0.85] [-0.79] [-0.65] [-0.57] 
TENURE     0.14 0.96 -1.86 -0.44 
    [0.14] [0.90] [-0.89] [-0.42] 
CONSTANT 150.01*** 110.53*** 121.28*** 130.39*** 154.32*** 122.94*** 
[8.88] [5.55] [6.46] [6.59] [3.78] [6.15] 
INDUSTRY Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YEAR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.0200 0.0274 0.0271 0.0309 0.0202 0.0246 
Obs 3605 3605 3605 2198 1407 3070 
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This table contains median regression results following eq. (4.2). The sample contains only the 
observations with positive pay-performance sensitivity, PPS. PPS is the pay-performance sensitivity, 
defined in eq. (4.1). PIN is the estimate of information asymmetry defined in section (4.3.2). SIZE is 
the logarithm of total market value of equity, VOLATILITY is the annualized volatility of daily stock 
returns, Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of equity plus book value of total debts divided by 
the book value of assets, STATE is the percentage of shares held by the state agency, GOV is the 
dummy variable that takes 1 if state owned firms, INS is the percentage of shares held by institutions, 
SHRZ is the ownership of the largest shareholder over that of the second largest shareholder,  AGE is 
the  age of CEO and TENURE is the number of years as CEO worked in the firm. Figures in brackets 
are t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
  
94 
 
Table 15 CEO compensation and probability of informed trading: endogeneity 
test 
 
Independent 
Variables  
1st stage 2SLS 2nd stage 1st stage 2SLS 2nd stage 
  IV reg 
firm fixed 
effects   IV reg 
firm fixed 
effects 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PIN 
31825*** 39294*** 11095* 18462** 
[2.91] [2.88] [1.75] [2.05] 
ERROR 
0.16* 0.20** 
[1.70] [2.15] 
DISPERSION 
0.05** 
[2.28] 
SIZE 
-0.02*** -643.97*** -846.69*** -0.02*** -217.69* -406.38** 
[-23.43] [-2.86] [-2.88] [-23.52] [-1.66] [-2.03] 
VOLATILITY 
-0.16*** -5143.73*** -6284.66*** -0.16*** -1811.14* -2978.22** 
[-25.71] [-2.91] [-2.87] [-25.81] [-1.76] [-2.03] 
Q 
-0.01*** -369.33*** -471.47*** -0.01*** -137.40* -240.37** 
[-9.81] [-2.95] [-3.02] [-9.38] [-1.83] [-2.25] 
ROA 
0.00 174.51 96.63 -0.01 224.82 245.68 
[0.19] [0.71] [0.24] [-0.94] [0.91] [0.61] 
STATE 
-0.01** 183.3 33.26 -0.01** 24.21 -133.36 
[-1.96] [1.64] [0.10] [-2.00] [0.27] [-0.77] 
INS 
0.00*** 11.02** 13.19** 0.00*** 2.98 5.15 
[8.45] [2.54] [2.40] [8.54] [1.40] [1.35] 
SHRZ 
-0.00* -0.81* -1.17* -0.00* -0.17 -0.51 
[-1.75] [-1.75] [-1.90] [-1.75] [-0.45] [-0.98] 
AGE 
-0.00*** -13.18*** -12.87 -0.00*** -4.69 -4.28 
[-2.98] [-2.59] [-1.63] [-2.91] [-1.33] [-0.64] 
TENURE 
0.00 87.54*** 29.02 0.00 21.29** -8.32 
[0.12] [3.11] [0.76] [1.54] [2.19] [-0.25] 
CONSTANT 
0.76*** 23773.42*** 30624.00*** 0.77 8053.91* 14513.72** 
[38.45] [2.86] [2.89] [38.54] [1.68] [2.04] 
INDUSTRY No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
YEAR No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
R2 0.3091 0.0092 0.0142 0.3100 0.0075 0.0121 
Obs 3079 3079 3079 3079 3079 3079 
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The two-stage least squares (2SLS) panel regression uses financial analysts’ forecast error and 
dispersion along with other firm-specific variables as instruments for PIN. Columns (1) and (4) 
present first-stage regression estimates with PIN as dependent variable. Column (2), (3), (4) and (5) 
present second stage regression estimates with the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) as dependent 
variable. The sample consists of listed firm in China stock markets from 2003 to 2009. Regressions 
include industry dummies and year dummies. Figures in brackets are heteroskedasticity- consistent t-
statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
